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THE CASE AGAINST THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED FREE
EXERCISE EXEMPTION
William P. Marshall*
Should religious claimants receive an exemption from neu-
tral laws under the free exercise clause of the first amendment?
The Author argues that granting a free exercise exemption
from neutral laws creates a number of serious problems, in-
cluding constitutional and definitional ones. He focuses on the
arguments that have been advanced in support of the free exer-
cise analysis and the weakness of those arguments. Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
which was decided as this Article was going to press, supports
many of the contentions made in this Article and is briefly
noted.
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE is unique in constitu-
tional law. Because direct regulation of religious activity almost
never occurs, the litigation surrounding free exercise addresses
only incidental and inadvertent regulation of religious conduct.
For this reason, the issue in a free exercise challenge typically is
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These remarks were originally presented in a symposium entitled Religion and the
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not whether a law is constitutional; the law under attack is usually
constitutionally unassailable outside of its incidental effect on reli-
gious practice. Rather, the issue is whether certain individuals
should be exempted from otherwise valid, neutral laws of general
applicability solely because of their religious conviction. The juris-
prudence of free exercise, in short, is the jurisprudence of the con-
stitutionally compelled exemption.'
There are a number of tensions underlying the notion of the
constitutionally compelled exemption, and underlying the constitu-
tional treatment of religion and religious belief, that make free
exercise jurisprudence a particularly difficult subject for coherent
analysis. First, because special exemptions of any kind raise con-
cerns of undue favoritism, they are normally suspect as violating
fundamental constitutional principles of equal treatment.' Thus,
as the Court noted just last week, the conclusion that the Consti-
tution may require the creation of an exemption directly contra-
dicts the constitutional norm.3
Second, the difficulties inherent in exemptions are exacer-
bated when an exemption favors religion. Beyond general equality
notions, the advancement of religion triggers a separate and spe-
cific constitutional provision, the establishment clause. Thus, as
has been commonly noted, the free exercise claim for constitution-
ally compelled exemptions leads to a first amendment jurispru-
dence that simultaneously calls for special deference to religion
I. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemption and the Free Exercise Clause, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 985 (1986). As Dean Stone indicates, the constitutionally
compelled exemption is not unique to free exercise. Occasionally, exemptions have been
made under the speech and assembly clauses. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Cam-
paign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982) (the first amendment prohibits a state from compel-
ling disclosure by a minor political party of its campaign contributions and recipients of
campaign disbursements when that party has historically been subject to threats and har-
assment); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (compelled
disclosure of the NAACP's membership lists will probably constitute a restraint on its
members' freedom of association).
2. See, e.g., Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model
of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 356 (1980) ("Exemption doctrine has . . .
been unable to provide a principled answer to objections that religion-based exemptions
contradict the rule of law, violate general notions of equal treatment, and violate the estab-
lishment clause." (citations omitted)).
3. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
58 U.S.L.W. 4433, 4437 (1990) [hereinafter Smith II] ("a private right to ignore generally
applicable laws . . . is a constitutional anomaly"); see also Stone & Marshall, Brown v.
Socialist Workers: Inequality as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 583, 584 (noting that constitutionally compelled exemptions are exceptional in consti-
tutional law.).
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under the free exercise clause and a prohibition of special defer-
ence under the establishment clause.4
Third, the claim for constitutionally compelled free exercise
exemptions raises virtually insoluble problems in determining
when a religious claim is bona fide. Such an inquiry necessarily
requires investigation into the religiosity and sincerity of the reli-
gious belief at stake; however, defining religion and ascertaining
sincerity have proved to be highly elusive undertakings.5 Further-
more, any inquiry into definition or sincerity is itself risky. Al-
lowing the courts or the government to investigate and label be-
liefs as "irreligious" or "insincere" raises a threat to religious
liberty.' Moreover, the importance of the sincerity and definition
inquiries to free exercise claims for exemption cannot be over-
stated. In effect, sincerity and religiosity are the only criteria for
determining what constitutes a legitimate religious claim. Because
religious beliefs are so diverse, as one observer has written, "eve-
rything is [potentially] covered by the free exercise clause."'
Finally, as has been noted in recent academic literature, reli-
gious matters do not easily lend themselves to existing constitu-
tional analysis. Constitutional analysis is individual-rights-ori-
ented;8 religion is often communal.9 Rights-oriented thinking
4. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PirT. L. REV. 673, 673 (1980) (examining the tension between the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause). But see Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion,
Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. REv. 739, 739 (1986) [herein-
after Lupu, Keeping the Faith] (arguing that a close comparison of the principles underly-
ing the religion and equal protection clauses avoids a conflict between the establishment
and free exercise clauses).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965) ("[Iln no field of
human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in the communication of
ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental questions of man's predicament in life, in
death, or in final judgment and retribution."); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86 (1944) ("Men may believe what they cannot prove."); Weiss, Privilege, Posture,
and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964) ("to define the limits
of religious expression may be impossible").
6. See infra text accompanying notes 135-49; see also Heins, "Other People's
Faiths'" The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 153, 157-58 (1981) ("The very inquiry into belief, whether by the courts, by
government agencies, or by adverse parties through discovery tends to inhibit religious
practice and excessively entangles secular bodies in religious doings. This is true whether
the inquisitions probe verity or sincerity." (footnote omitted)).
7. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REv.
779, 783 (1986).
8. See Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DuKE L.J. 977, 985.
9. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 19 [hereinafter
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presupposes that the individual has numerous equally viable ave-
nues through which to exercise her freedom of choice; religion is
often absolutist. 10 Therefore, placing religion in a legal framework
often raises a square-peg/round-hole problem.
A number of years ago I proposed for the free exercise prob-
lem a solution that essentially eliminated claims to a constitution-
ally based free exercise exemption." I argued that free exercise
claims advanced by those seeking relief from laws of general ap-
plicability should be resolved under the speech clause. In essence,
free exercise claimants would be entitled to relief only to the ex-
tent their claims would be protected under the speech clause. For
example, a religious group would not be entitled to exemption
from state restrictions on soliciting contributions unless 1) the so-
licitation was protected under the speech clause and 2) non-reli-
gious groups engaging in solicitation would also be entitled to pro-
tection. As the example above suggests, this thesis is comprised of
two primary components. The first concerns the degree of consti-
tutional protection to be accorded those presenting free exercise
claims. In many circumstances, a claimant may present both a
free exercise and a speech claim. In the situation noted above, for
example, the religious group seeking exemption from solicitation
regulation has a cognizable free exercise and a cognizable speech
claim.' 2 At the same time, a non-religious group such as a public-
interest organization, which might also seek exemption from a so-
licitation restriction, would present only a speech claim.'" If free
exercise is treated as expression, the result will obviously be that
McConnell, Accommodation]; Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CoNN. L. REV.
701, 734 (1986) [hereinafter Tushnet, Religion].
10. See Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 283 (1989) (contrasting the individual choice inherent in
religious freedom with the "most fundamental obligations" imposed on "the religious faith-
ful" by religion itself); Sandel, Religious Liberty - Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of
Choice?, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 597, 614-15 ("The Court's tendency to assimilate religious
liberty to liberty in general . . . confuses the pursuit of preferences with the exercise of
duties and so forgets the special concern of religious liberty with the claims of conscien-
tiously encumbered selves.")
11. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67
MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (solicitation by the Krishnas at a fairground implemented both
free exercise and speech clauses).
13. See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 962
(1984) (charitable fundraising constitutes speech under the first amendment); Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (same).
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the religious and non-religious groups will be accorded the same
level of protection. In short, under this theory a religious claimant
will be entitled to no greater protection than a non-religious
claimant, the presence of a free exercise interest notwith-
standing.14
The second component of the thesis, admittedly more contro-
versial, concerns the scope of religious activities entitled to consti-
tutional protection. It argues that the boundaries of protected free
exercise activity should be defined by the boundaries of free
speech.' 5 Although, according to the current jurisprudence, a
claim under the free exercise clause will often also implicate the
speech clause, many claims currently recognized as implicating
free exercise protection do not easily fit within a speech analysis.
For example, the religious objection to working in an armaments
factory, recognized as implicating rights of free exercise in
Thomas v. Review Board,6 does not, at least under existing
speech theory, present a colorable speech claim. Under the theory
posited here, the religious claim will not be constitutionally pro-
tected unless protection is also extended to parallel objections
based on non-religious grounds, such as those of moral philosophy.
In short, whether an activity implicates the first amendment ought
not turn on whether the activity is religious or secular.
While some commentators have been kind enough to give a
title to the free exercise as expression thesis - it is often called
the reduction principle 7 - it has captured no' adherents, at least
in the academic world. Nevertheless, what has struck me since I
wrote that article is not the persuasiveness of my own thesis, but
rather the infirmity of the arguments made on behalf of the free
exercise exemption. Thus, while I recognize that my thesis may be
imperfect, it remains the best available approach to the controver-
sial free exercise issue. This Article, therefore, defends the rejec-
tion of the constitutionally compelled exemption. Part I describes
the theory's doctrinal underpinnings and its relation to current Su-
14. Marshall, supra note 11, at 586-87; cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
164 (1944) ("[None] of the great liberties insured by the First [Amendment] can be given
higher place than the others.").
15. Marshall, supra note 11, at 565-72.
16. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
17. See Ingber, supra note 10, at 241; Tushet, Religion, supra note 9, at 713; see
also Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 307
n.36 (Pepper notes the theory without denominating it "the reduction principle").
1989-90]
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preme Court decisions.' 8 Part II presents and responds to the ar-
guments in favor of recognizing constitutionally compelled exemp-
tions under the free exercise clause. 9 Part III presents the
arguments that compel the rejection of the free exercise claim for
exemptions. 20 Part IV examines some of the competing ap-
proaches to the free exercise claims for exemption and concludes
that, although the approaches may differ significantly in rhetoric,
they do not differ significantly in result from that reached here.2'
Part V addresses what appears to be the true underlying reason
'for opposition to abandonment of the constitutionally compelled
free exercise exemption: that the rejection of free exercise is fun-
damentally the product of an antipathy to religion.22 Finally, I
conclude where I began, with the proposition that free exercise
claims for special exemption from neutral laws of general applica-
bility should be rejected.
I. FREE EXERCISE AS EXPRESSION: DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. Religiously Motivated Activity as Expression
In Widmar v. Vincent,23 the Court reviewed the claim of
members of a religious organization who alleged that they were
unconstitutionally denied the right to pray together on a state-
university campus. The Court held that the appropriate vehicle for
review of this constitutional claim was the free speech clause.24
Prayer, in short, was speech.25 The Widmar Court's reliance on
the speech clause was not surprising. It was simply illustrative of a
long line of cases which had reviewed under the speech clause the
claims of religious organizations to engage in religiously directed
practice.2 6
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-75.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 76-134.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 135-203.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 204-23.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 224-53.
23. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
24. Id. at 269.
25. See id. at 269-70 n.6 (refuting the dissent's claim that religious worship falls
within the free exercise clause and is unprotected by the speech clause).
26. See infra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941) (challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses to ordinance that required permit
before a march could be undertaken analyzed under speech clause); Lovell v. City of Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (Jehovah's Witnesses' attack on ordinance proscribing the distri-
bution or sale of literature analyzed under speech clause).
[Vol. 40:357
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Of course, the observation that two separate constitutional
provisions might govern one activity is not surprising. Frequently,
constitutional provisions can, and do, overlap.2" What is surpris-
ing, however, is the extent to which the free speech inquiry has
dominated the free exercise inquiry. The two freedoms were inter-
twined in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the 1930's and 1940's.
In those cases, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of state
restrictions on religiously motivated activities such as solicitation,
proselytizing, distribution of religious literature, and preaching.2"
In almost all of the cases in which the Jehovah's Witnesses pre-
vailed, the Court found the governing provision to be the speech
clause.29 Although the free exercise clause was occasionally men-
tioned, in no case did the Court recognize a free exercise claim
where a speech claim would have failed.30 The message of these
27. See, e.g., Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (The
.equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First Amendment inter-
ests."); Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
20, 20-21 (1975) (In a number of ... cases involving first amendment interests, the Su-
preme Court has used the framework of equal protection analysis to limit the government's
power to restrict free expression.").
28. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (loudspeaker permit require-
ment invalidated on free speech grounds when Jehovah's Witness used loudspeaker for
preaching); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction of Jeho-
vah's Witness under state child-labor law when she allowed her niece to distribute religious
literature on the street, despite claim of religious freedom); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (revenue tax on door-to-door sales of religious books and pamphlets found
unconstitutional); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (restriction on religious
solicitation held a violation of the first amendment); see also Marshall, supra note 11, at
561-65 ("[T]he activities in question in [the Jehovah's Witnesses] cases were as integrally
religious as preaching, worship, and proselytizing. ... ); Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free
Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115, 1121-30 (1973) (discussing the interrelation of the free exer-
cise clause and the free speech clause in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases).
29. The only possible exception was Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
(1944), which indicated that religious speech could be singled out for special constitutional
protection. The Court invalidated a license tax imposed on Jehovah's Witnesses when they
distributed religious material door-to-door, holding that the tax burdened their free exer-
cise rights under the first amendment. Id. at 578. Follett has recently been questioned, if
not overruled, in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 110 S. Ct.
688, 693-95 (1990) (The Court decided the case "by limiting . . .Follett to apply only
where a flat license tax operates as a prior restraint on the free exercise of religious
beliefs.").
30. See Pfeffer, supra note 28, at 1124-26 (the Jehovah's Witnesses cases were based
largely on the speech clause). As Professor Leo Pfeffer has noted in analyzing the Supreme
Court's decisions in this area:
The chronicle can be summed up briefly and starkly: In every case in which
a claim under the free exercise clause was upheld, it was bracketed with a free
speech or free press claim; conversely, whenever free exercise stood alone it was
unsuccessful. Realistically, free exercise did not have a separate but equal exis-
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cases was clear: No activity was so essentially religious that it
warranted protection only under the free exercise clause."a
B. Protection for Rights of Conscience Under the Speech
Clause
The speech clause's dominion over claims involving religious
exercise is not limited to expressive activities. It also includes
more passive activities like rights of conscience. In a series of
cases, the Court has upheld on speech clause grounds the rights of
persons, whether religiously motivated or not, to refrain from cer-
tain state-compelled activities because participation in those activ-
ities conflicted with their consciences.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette3 2 and,
more recently, Wooley v. Maynard3 are examples of cases in
which the Supreme Court has recognized that a right to forego an
activity because of religious principle is protected under the
speech clause. Barnette invalidated a compulsory flag-salute re-
quirement that was repugnant to Jehovah's Witnesses. Although
the objection was based on religion, the Court, viewing the issue
as involving freedom of conscience, found the conscientious objec-
tion to have arisen under the speech clause irrespective of its reli-
gious basis.34
In Wooley, claimant George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness,
objected to the New Hampshire license plate motto, "Live Free or
Die," on the basis of his moral, ethical, political, and religious
beliefs.35 The Court, again relying on speech rather than on nar-
rower free exercise grounds, upheld Maynard's objection. Accord-
ing to the Court, Maynard presented a "right to refrain from
speaking" based on the "broader concept of 'individual freedom of
mind,'" which entitled him to protection.36 Thus, these cases and
tence, or even one that was separate and unequal; it had practically no existence
at all.
Pfeffer, supra note 28, at 1130 (footnotes omitted).
31. See Marshall, supra note 11, at 561-65 (concluding that religious activities typi-
cally have been protected under the speech clause rather than the free exercise clause).
32. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
34. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35 (explaining that religion is only one motive for
challenging compulsory flag salute and that those without a religious motive can sustain a
challenge based on an infringement of the "constitutional liberties of the individual").
35. 430 U.S. at 713.
36. Id. at 714 (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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others37 establish that the free exercise clause is not the exclusive
guardian for rights of conscience 8 and that significant protection
for rights of conscience exists under the speech clause.39
C. The Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's current free exercise approach does
not, in theory, reject the constitutionally compelled exemption.
Beginning in 1963, with Sherbert v. Verner,40 the Court adopted a
separate free exercise inquiry which allowed for the creation of
constitutionally compelled exemptions for religious exercise in cer-
tain circumstances. From 1963 until quite recently, the Court has
been consistent in articulating the test it ostensibly applies in its
free exercise decisions.4' According to the Court, government in-
fringement on free exercise rights will be upheld as constitutional
only when supported by a compelling state interest.42 Essentially,
this test parallels the strict scrutiny inquiry the Court uses in re-
viewing purported infringements of the most fundamental consti-
37. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (newly appointed public defender
could not dismiss assistants solely because of their political beliefs); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (state law could not constitutionally require non-union pub-
lic employees to contribute to union political activities which they opposed); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976) (employees could not be forced to pledge allegiance to political
party).
38. The Court has been equivocal in deciding whether a right of conscience based on
religious or secular beliefs should be protected by the free speech clause or by the religious
exercise clause. The Court has employed the free speech clause to uphold the right of a
person who may forego an otherwise compulsory activity because of his religious principles.
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943). By the same token, a right of conscience lacking religious motivation
was held sufficient, on religion clause grounds, to sustain the right of an atheist to object to
taking an oath affirming belief in God. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1961) (state could not compel notary public to declare belief in God); cf. Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (statutory provision excluding religious conscientious objectors
from the draft applied to person whose objection was based on non-religious grounds).
39. Arguably, Barnette and Wooley create only a very limited right of conscience -
specifically, a right applicable only to objection to state-compelled speech. There is some
merit to this argument. The conscience cases have not been extended to all types of activ-
ity. Wooley, however, appears to stand for something more than simply a right of non-
speech. See Marshall, supra note 11, at 569 n.131 ("In light of Pruneyard [a later Su-
preme Court case], Wooley stands for the proposition that freedom of expression also pro-
tects a right to be free from governmental attempts to coerce beliefs by forcing individuals
to express a message they do not believe in .... .
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. The Court's recent vacillation with respect to the Sherbert test is discussed later.
Infra text accompanying notes 60-75.
42. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09.
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tutional rights.43 Nevertheless, despite the Court's professed alle-
giance to a fixed constitutional standard, free exercise
jurisprudence has never been consistent in result." Rather, the
only consistency that has emerged is the Court's extraordinary re-
luctance to vindicate free exercise claims outside those protected
under the speech clause. It has done so in only five cases, and
those five cases are extremely limited in scope. One, Wisconsin v.
43. See, e.g., Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 864,
880 (1988) ("In free exercise cases the Supreme Court has followed the same general
approach used for certain other constitutional rights such as the right of association, free
speech and equal protection"); Lupu, Where Rights Begin The Problem of Burdens on the
Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 934 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Bur-
dens] ("the government will prevail only if it proves that a favorable response to these
claims and others like them would substantially undermine government interests of unusual
importance.").
44. Indeed, the Court's first two modern free exercise cases, Sherbert and Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), were criticized by commentators and members of the
Court alike as being hopelessly inconsistent. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 417 (in his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Stewart remarked, "I cannot agree that today's decision can stand
consistently with Braunfeld v. Brown .... ); R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
RELIGION 145-47 (1972) (Sherbert and Braunfeld cannot be reconciled); Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1322 (1970)
(Sherbert and Braunfeld are as irreconcilable as two cases not involving the same parties
can be); Pfeffer, supra note 28, at 1139 (impossible to reconcile the cases); Note, supra
note 2, at 354 n.28 (the two cases have never been adequately reconciled).
In Braunfeld, the Court refused to grant an exemption from a Sunday closing law to
religious persons whose beliefs forbade them from working on Saturdays, despite the obvi-
ous resulting economic hardship. In rejecting the challenge, the Court noted simply that
mere inconvenience, economic hardship, or competitive disadvantage was insufficient to
compel exemption. 366 U.S. at 605-06. The Court stated that "the Sunday law simply
regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the prac-
tice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605.
In Sherbert, on the other hand, the Court created an exemption from a state unem-
ployment compensation law for a Seventh-Day Adventist whose religious beliefs forbidding
work on Saturdays also resulted in economic consequences. Under the state unemployment-
compensation scheme, the religious adherent would be disqualified from receiving unem-
ployment-compensation benefits if she refused Saturday employment. This disqualification
placed the claimant in the position of having to choose between adhering to her religious
beliefs and forfeiting state benefits, on the one hand, and accepting work in disregard of
her religious convictions on the other. The Court concluded that imposing this choice on
the appellant was unconstitutional. 374 U.S. at 410. In Sherbert, unlike Braunfeld, eco-
nomic disadvantage was enough to compel exemption.
The Court's apparent inconsistencies do not end with Sherbert and Braunfeld. Other
cases, including two involving the Amish, have similarly led to discordant results. In Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the state's interest in compul-
sory education was insufficient to override the interest of the Amish in removing their chil-
dren from public schools. Id. at 235-36. Yet, in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982),
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the application of social security taxes to the
Amish against their religious objection, although the only governmental interest involved
was apparently ease of administration. Id. at 258.
[Vol. 40:357
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Yoder,45 which held that the Amish were entitled to constitutional
exemption from compulsory-education laws, is so tied to its facts
that it is without strong precedential value.16 The Court empha-
sized the uniqueness of the Amish and conceded that "few other
religious groups or sects" would be entitled to similar exemption)7
The other cases include the seminal Sherbert decision 48 and
the trilogy of Thomas v. Review Board,49 Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Commission," and Frazee v. Illinois Department
of Employment Security,51 three cases which are essentially Sher-
bert re-visited. In all four cases, the Court addressed the same
issue: whether a state could deny unemployment benefits to an ap-
plicant whose failure to be available for work was due to religious
conviction. In each case the Court concluded that the free exercise
clause prohibited the state from withholding benefits. A claimant
could not be forced to choose between adhering to his beliefs and
forfeiting state benefits on the one hand, and accepting work that
violated his religious convictions on the other.52
The unemployment-benefits cases have not, however, been ac-
corded strong precedential force. In subsequent cases, the Court
45. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
46. Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism". Proposed Stan-
dards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 388-89 (1986) (explaining that the "ruling in Yoder was firmly
anchored to the special situation of the Amish faith" and describing this ruling as tied to
these particular facts).
47. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42 (discussing Sherbert and its role in the
development of exemptions from free excercise protection).
49. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Wit-
ness who quit a job that entailed producing weapons because it conflicted with his religious
beliefs violated the free exercise clause).
50. 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denial of unemployment compensation to Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist fired for refusing to work on Saturday violated free exercise clause).
51. 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989) (denial of unemployment compensation to Christian who
refused to work on Sundays violated free exercise clause even though the refusal was not
based on the tenets of a particular Christian sect).
52. Hobble, 480 U.S. at 146 ("[Tlhe state may not force an employee 'to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work.'" (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (conditioning a benefit upon
religiously proscribed conduct or denying a benefit because of religiously compelled con-
duct places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410
("[N]o state may 'exclude individual . . . members of any . . . faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.'" (quoting
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); see also Frazee, 109 S. Ct. at 1516
(citing Hobble, Thomas and Sherbert).
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
has denied claims for religious exemption from the minimum
wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,58 tax payment requirements of the Social Security
Act, 54 and the government's use of social security number regis-
tration requirements in food stamp and welfare programs. 55 In
these cases, the governmental interests, primarily ease of adminis-
tration and fear of fraudulent claims, were "relatively weak."5 In
addition, the Court has been quick to reject free exercise claims
that have arisen in prison and military contexts on the grounds
that these institutions should be accorded unusual judicial defer-
ence.57 Finally, the Court has unanimously rejected the free exer-
cise claims for special exemption from tax laws that have been
brought before it.58 The denial of religious claims in all of these
53. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
(provisions of the FLSA regarding minimum wages, overtime, and recordkeeping may be
complied with without burdening the religious rights of the regulated parties).
54. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (state's limitation on religious liberty
in requiring Amish to pay taxes that fund social security benefits was justified by the gov-
ernment's showing that denying such exemptions was essential to the government's interest
in providing these benefits).
55. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (free exercise clause is not violated by statu-
tory requirement that a state agency use social security number in administering federal
food stamp and welfare programs, notwithstanding that the use of social security numbers
violates a central tenet of Native American religious belief, which asserts that using num-
bers harms an individual's spirit). Bowen is somewhat ambiguous however, as to the extent
that it retreats from Sherbert. Apparently there were enough votes to indicate that a ma-
jority of the Court might recognize the free exercise claim of a food stamp applicant not to
apply for and use a social security number. Id. at 714-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part); Id. at 728-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, however,
considered the issue moot and a four-Justice plurality actually rejected this claim. See also
Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 429
(1986) ("if the trial court's findings on remand persuade [Justice] Blackmun that the case
is not moot, there appear to be five votes to apply the compelling interest test and invali-
date the requirement that conscientious objectors personally apply for, and use their social
security number.").
56. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146, 153
(1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Neutrality] ("The Court frequently [especially recently]
rejects free exercise challenges even when the government's secular programmatic interest
is relatively weak.").
57. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (prison regulations
prohibiting Islamic from attending religious services do not violate prisoners' rights under
the free exercise clause); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our review
of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential
than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.").
58. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 688, 698
(1990) (establishment clause does not prohibit imposition of state sales tax on religious
organization's sale of religious literature); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
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circumstances has led a number of commentators to question
whether the Court actually applies strict scrutiny or a substan-
tially less stringent mode of review in free exercise cases.59
In fact, in recent cases the Court has begun to waver in its
characterization of the free exercise test and has even, in some
instances, substantially returned to its pre-Sherbert approach. For
example, Bowen v. Roy6" and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association61 mark a substantial retreat from the Sher-
bert doctrine. In Bowen, the Court was faced with a challenge to a
provision in the Social Security Act which required states to use
social security numbers in administering certain welfare pay-
ments. 2 In Lyng, the Court was faced with the claims of a num-
ber of native Americans who argued that the free exercise clause
prohibited the development of certain religious territory owned by
the government but sacred to their religious heritage.63 Using
minimal scrutiny, the Court rejected both challenges, holding that
"the Free Exercise Clause cannot be understood to require the
government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that com-
port with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."'64 The effect
of Lyng and Bowen on the continued viability of the Sherbert test
is substantial. For one, these cases, at the least, have removed an
entire area of potential government infringement on religious ex-
ercise, the infringement caused by conflict with internal govern-
ment affairs, from the compelling state interest test.6 5 More im-
portantly, the return to the barest level of scrutiny suggests a
possible further erosion of the compelling interest test.6
574 (1983) (denial of tax-exempt status to religiously affiliated university that maintained
racially discriminatory policies does not violate free exercise clause).
59. See, e.g., Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4
CONST. COMMENTARY 147, 154 (1987) ("[T]he Supreme Court has shown little enthusi-
asm for strict review in post-Sherbert and Yoder decisions."); Stone, supra note 1, at 994
("If one looks to the Court's results, rather than its rhetoric, however, one sees that the
actual scrutiny is often far from strict.").
60. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
61. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
62. See supra note 55.
63. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441-42.
64. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699; Lyng, 482 U.S. at 448 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at
699).
65. As Professor Lupu indicates, this is not a minor category. See Lupu, Burdens,
supra note 43, at 945 (the characterization of Lyng as an "internal procedures" case dem-
onstrates the breadth of that category).
66. Bowen, in fact, came fairly close to rejecting Sherbert altogether. The Bowen
Court was badly fragmented on a second free exercise issue raised by the claimants -
3691989-90]
370 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:357
Bowen is also be significant for the manner in which it char-
acterized Sherbert and Thomas, the only unemployment cases
that had been decided at the time. Bowen explained those cases as
involving discrimination against religion because the unemploy-
ment insurance programs at issue recognized only non-religious
reasons for an applicant to refuse work.17 The Court's articulation
of its rationale in this manner is potentially far-reaching. It effec-
tively excludes Sherbert and Thomas from the category of exemp-
tion cases and leaves Yoder as the only remaining true exemption
case.
68
Yet, even if Bowen and Lyng are solely internal operations
cases and even if Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee are
something more than discriminatory treatment cases, there is no
question that free exercise protection exists at best in diluted
form. Indeed, its most recent free exercise pronouncement, the
Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith (Smith I1),69 imposed the most far-reaching limitation
on Sherbert yet. In Smith II the Court was faced with the free
specifically, whether the government could force them to apply for and use social security
numbers in contravention of their religious beliefs. See supra note 55. The prevailing opin-
ion in Bowen announced that "the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that
a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application,
is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 707-08 (1986). As Justice O'Connor indicated in dissent, this standard relegated free
exercise review to the "barest level of minimum scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause
already provides." Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Bowen's flirtation with minimum scrutiny was later ostensibly rejected. Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (quoting the above statement
from Justice O'Connor's partial concurrence in Bowen in rejecting Bowen's standard); see
also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (1989) (stating
that the state interests must be sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate free exercise
claim).
67. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986).
68. Bowen's characterization of Sherbert and Thomas as merely discrimination cases
was later rejected in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 141-43
& 142 n.7 (1987). However, Smith II, 110 S. Ct. -, 58 U.S.L.W. 4433 (1990), sug-
gests that Bowen's narrow view of Sherbert and the other unemployment cases is very
much alive. Citing Bowen, the Smith II Court announced: "[O]ur decisions in the unem-
ployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hard-
ship' without compelling reason." Id. at -, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4436-37 (citing Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
In fact, in Smith II the Court suggested that even Yoder was not a true free exercise
exemption case but rather was based on a combination of rights of free exercise along with
the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. 110 S. Ct. at - n.l, 58
U.S.L.W. at 4436 n.l.
69. 110 S. Ct. - , 58 U.S.L.W. 4433 (1990).
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exercise claims of two Oregon state employees who had engaged
in religiously motivated peyote smoking. Characterizing the pe-
yote smoking as work-related misconduct, the state had fired the
employees from their positions as drug and alcohol abuse counsel-
ors. 7  The Supreme Court rejected their free exercise challenges.
The Smith II opinion is immediately notable for its limited read-
ing of free exercise precedent. Distinguishing Sherbert and
Yoder,71 the Court virtually denied even the existence of the con-
stitutionally compelled free exercise exemption. The Court stated
that it had "never held that and individual's religious beliefs ex-
cuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct the state is free to regulate" and that its previous deci-
sions "have consistently held that the right of free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability ..." ,,72 A serious ques-
tion thus remains after Smith II as to whether the free exercise
exemption will survive in any form.
Even in its narrowest reading, the limitation Smith II places
on free exercise exemption is dramatic. The Court held that even
if it
were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the un-
employment compensation field, we would not apply'it to require
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.
• ..To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law
contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs,
except where the State's interest in "compelling" - permitting
70. The most recent Smith opinion marks the second time the cas6 has been before
the Court. In its first round, the Court signalled its eventual holding in suggesting that free
exercise protection would extend to activities that were otherwise "valid." Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 480 U.S. 660, 671 (1988) [hereinafter
Smith I]. The Court, nevertheless, remanded the case for a determination of whether pe-
yote smoking for religious purposes would be legal in Oregon. Id. at 673-74. On remand
the Oregon Supreme Court held that peyote smoking in Oregon was illegal but vindicated
the free exercise claim, ostensibly apply the Sherbert standard. Smith v. Employment Div.,
763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or. 1988).
71. See supra note 68. The Court also distinguished Sherbert on the grounds that
statutory benefit cases invite consideration of the particular circumstance behind an appli-
cants unemployment and, therefore, lend themselves "to individual government assessment
of the reasons for the relevant conduct." 110 S. Ct. at -, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4436. The
Court's apparent argument is that a statutory "mechanism for individualized exemptions,"
id. at -, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4436 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708), might support a
constitutional requirement for free exercise exemptions. The logic behind this contention is
not readily apparent.
72. 110 S. Ct. at , 58 U.S.L.W. at 4435 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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him, by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself" -
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."1
Smith I thus holds that rights of free exercise do not extend to
criminally proscribed activity.
Because both the power of the criminal law in deterring con-
duct is so great and the power of the state to criminalize activity
so broad, even this narrow reading of Smith II is a dramatic un-
dercutting of Sherbert.4 Indeed, the suggestion that at most free
exercise protection extends only to activities that are otherwise
valid75 means effectively that its protections are limited only to
conditional-benefits cases, a category which not so coincidentally
includes Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee. At the least,
Smith is yet another suggestion that free exercise protection is not
expansive.
In summary, the current free exercise jurisprudence disfavors
exemptions. The combination of 1) the extraordinarily limited cir-
cumstances in which free exercise claims have been upheld; 2) the
less-than-compelling instances in which claims have been denied;
3) the Bowen/Lyng refusal to extend such protection to matters
affecting the government's internal operations; 4) the Smith II re-
fusal to extend free exercise protection to otherwise illegal activi-
ties; and 5) the significant protection religious activity has been
accorded outside of the speech clause, lead to one salient conclu-
sion: The explicit adoption of the position that free exercise claims
for exemption should be denied would not produce a dramatic al-
teration of the current jurisprudence.
II. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
COMPELLED EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Commentators generally do not dispute the conclusions set
forth in the previous section. They agree that, prior to Sherbert,
the protection of free exercise rights was afforded solely by the
speech clause7" and that the results under the Court's current ap-
proach differ little, if at all, from the results that would be
achieved under a free exercise as expression methodology." They
also agree that the creation of free exercise exemptions necessi-
73. 110 S. Ct. at -, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4436-37 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at __, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4441 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. at -, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4437.
76. E.g., Pepper, supra note 17, at 308.
77. E.g. Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at 717.
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tates inquiry into the sincerity and definition of religious belief
and that such investigation itself may be harmful to religious-lib-
erty interests. 8 Finally, commentators generally concede that a
theory that seeks exemption for religious exercise in effect advo-
cates preferred treatment for religion and religious belief. 9 In-
deed, the central argument of those favoring free exercise exemp-
tions is that the Court's failure to provide special protection to
free exercise rights apart from that provided by the speech clause
is exactly what is wrong with the current jurisprudence. To para-
phrase one commentator, the Court has failed to take free exercise
seriously."s This section will examine the arguments in favor of
the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption.
A. Text
1. Redundancy
The first argument raised by those seeking more stringent
free exercise protection is textual. The first amendment explicitly
provides for the protection of rights of free exercise. Some com-
mentators contend that, in order to make this provision meaning-
ful, the free exercise clause must be given its independence from
the speech clause, in part through constitutionally compelled ex-
emptions.8 Accordingly, denying claims for free exercise and re-
dressing such claims only under the speech clause must be mis-
guided, since it would turn the free exercise clause into a textual
redundancy. 2
This textual argument, however, is deficient on a number of
grounds. For one, it is descriptively inaccurate. The free exercise
position advocated here pertains only to claims for special exemp-
78. E.g., Pepper, supra note 17, at 326.
79. See Pfeffer, surpa note 28. The commentators differ, as will be discussed subse-
quently, only in asserting that the sincerity and definition concerns do not outweigh the
need for a more stringent free exercise review. See infra notes 132-48 & 200-19, and ac-
companying text.
80. Pepper, supra note 17, at 335-36.
81. See, e.g., Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at 718 (There is a "fundamental diffi-
culty" in the reduction principle's denying that the first amendment text affirms "a distinc-
tion between religion and other forms of expression").
82. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Religion Clause would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which
religious practice took the form of speech."); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 336 (1969) (suggesting that such a textual interpretation
would be redundant).
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tion from laws of general applicability. The free exercise clause
may have independent vitality in restricting judicial involvement
in intra-church property and employment disputes.83 More clearly,
the clause retains an independent vitality with respect to laws that
directly attempt to infringe upon religious freedom. s4 While there
have been thankfully few instances of direct persecutions for the
free exercise clause to redress, the fact that protection from direct
prosecution has been largely unneeded does not make the clause a
redundancy.8 5
Nor is the clause a redundancy because even persecutory
laws could arguably be invalidated under another constitutional
provision, the equal-protection clause. 86 The equal protection
clause probably extends to such persecutory laws." Even so, it is
hard to see how this point leads to the conclusion that the free
exercise clause must be construed as allowing constitutionally
compelled exemptions. The subsequent passage and later expan-
sion of the equal protection clause to cover the ground previously
protected by the free exercise clause does not mean the protections
of the free exercise clause must be expanded to cover new
territory.
83. Admittedly, whether the source of the limitation is the free exercise clause or the
establishment clause is not clear. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (claim-
ing "the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on
the basis of religious doctrine" and opting for "neutral principles of law" when settling
church property disputes); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976) (when faced with a church's decision to defrock a bishop, court looked to First and
Fourteenth Amendments in stating that "civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of [the
church] in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them"); Pres-
byterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 449 (1969) ("Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening
their doors to disputes involving church property [because] there are neutral principles of
law ... which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is
awarded.").
84. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) ("[H]istorical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance . . . gave concern to those who drafted the free exercise
clause."); see also Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 159 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(1943) ("[T]he First Amendment separately mention[s] free exercise of religion [because
of the] history of religious persecution .... ").
85. One case, in fact, does fit the description of a law improperly singling out religion
for disfavored treatment. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (law prohibiting
clergy from holding public office held violative of the free exercise clause).
86. lngber, supra note 10, at 242-43.
87. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) ("Unless a classification
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such
as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory
discriminations [subject to their passing a rational-relationship test] .... ").
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Moreover, it is hardly novel to assert that mention in the text
of the first amendment does not require constitutionally favored
treatment other than protection against direct persecution. The
press clause, also located in the first amendment, has been held
not to confer a favored status on the media.88 Rather, the press
clause has been interpreted only to protect the media from "invid-
ious discrimination."8
Finally, the argument that a textual passage must be given
concrete meaning is misleading when that argument is used to ad-
vance a specific interpretation of that text. Separate arguments
must be given in support of the substance behind the purported
textual interpretation. In the free exercise context, proponents of
more stringent free exercise exemptions must present arguments
that demonstrate why the free exercise clause should be inter-
preted to require constitutionally compelled exemptions from neu-
tral laws of general applicability. That the text of the first amend-
ment explicitly mentions free exercise does not by itself establish
this position.9"
2. The Use (or Non-Use) of History - A Parenthetical
Historical inquiry also does not support the claim for the con-
stitutionally compelled claim for free exercise exemption. For one,
the relevant historical evidence, like that underlying other issues
concerning the religion clauses of the first amendment, is unclear.
As Dean Choper has stated, "there is no clear record as to the
Framers' intent, and such history as there is reflects several vary-
88. See, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) ("Neither the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access [for the press] to
government information or sources of information within the government's control."); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[T]he history of the [press] clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a
'special' or 'institutional' privilege."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (The
press clause does not create a special privilege from laws of general applicability.); see also
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 963 (2d ed. 1988) ("[P]revailing view is that
the press enjoys no special status under the Constitution"). But see Stewart, "Or of the
Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) (the press clause does confer a special status,
and a refusal to acknowledge this would make the press clause a "constitutional
redundancy").
89. See L. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 963 ("To be sure, despite its separate protection
by the first amendment, the prevailing view is that the press enjoys no special status under
the Constitution. But the press is protected at least from invidious discrimination." (cita-
tions omitted)).
90. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. , -' 58 U.S.L.W. 4433, 4435 (1990).
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ing purposes." 9' Moreover, any historical evidence must be tem-
pered by the understanding that the first amendment was not in-
tended to apply to the states. Federalism concerns, as well as
issues of substantive religious liberty, surrounded the adoption of
the religion clauses.92
Some observations, however, are interesting, if not dispositive.
For example, there is a significant question as to whether even the
concept of a religious exemption is consistent with the framers'
intellectual framework. The framers obviously were aware that
the beliefs of religious adherents could stand in opposition to the
religious mandates of the state. The foisting of religious values
upon religious dissidents by state enforcement of an established
church's precepts was one of the central religion clause concerns.9"
The framers were also aware of another infringement on religious
freedom caused by state laws: A number of states imposed disabil-
ities on persons refusing to take oaths, although oath-taking was
offensive to the religious tenets of some sects. 94 However, outside
of these conflicts with state religious laws or test requirements, it
is difficult to find examples where religious objections to the secu-
lar laws of the state were recognized. 95 In fact, outside of religious
91. Choper, supra note 4, at 676 (footnote omitted).
92. The establishment clause, for example, was intended to protect state churches
from a potentially superseding federal establishment. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 6 (1982) (amendments
proposed at the State Ratifying Conventions "clearly indicated that the states wanted to
prevent the establishment of a national religion or the elevation of a particular religious
sect to preferred status").
93. See, e.g., McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 21-22 ("The principle
objects of the Religion Clauses . . . were to prevent coercion (and lesser forms of govern-
ment pressure) in matters of religion and to encourage a multiplicity of religious sects.").
94. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 34, 48-50 (1986) (requisite oaths of allegiance for
settlers and for legislators in Virginia and in Maryland, respectively, precluded Catholics,
who could not pledge to denounce all spiritual power to a foreign prince, and Quakers, who
could not subscribe to any oath, from settling or from holding elected office in those states);
A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (1964) (many
states used religious tests, such as "belief in the Bible's inspiration," as qualifications for
holding public office); Bradley, The No Religious Test and the Constitution of Religious
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681-94, 714-
20 (1987) (much debate at the Constitutional convention concerning religious requirements
for holding public office stemmed from the fact that although religious tests were essen-
tially compatible with notions of "freedom of conscience" and "religious liberty" prevalent
at the time, some prominent delegates believed such tests were unjust).
95. The one exception to this is the recognition of possible religious objections to
military conscription, but that issue has its own peculiar history. In 1789, Madison pro-
posed a constitutional amendment providing for conscientious-objector exemption from mil-
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laws or tests, one can convincingly argue that the framers did not
envision potential religious exemptions as applying to neutral laws
of general applicability. A number of reasons support this
contention.
One is that the governing intellectual climate of the late
eighteenth century was that of deism, or natural law, which as-
sumed that religious tenets and the laws of temporal authority co-
incided.9 The first Supreme Court decisions on free exercise, de-
cided roughly 100 years after the passage of Bill of Rights, are
classic, if somewhat vitriolic, examples of this approach to religion
and the law of the state. In Reynolds v. United States97 and Davis
itary service for "religiously scrupulous" persons. W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 123
(1986). The significance of this as it concerns the historical debate surrounding constitu-
tionally compelled exemptions, however, is not clear. On the one hand, it suggests that the
framers were aware of the possibility of conscientious objection to religiously neutral laws.
On the other, it indicates that even if the framers were aware of this possibility, they did
not view the free exercise clause as addressing the issue. Indeed, the fact that a conscien-
tious-objection amendment was proposed suggests that the free exercise clause was not
thought, by itself, to provide for religious exemptions from neutral laws. The rejection of
the proposed amendment, in turn, may suggest that the framers also rejected the principle
that religious activities should be entitled to special constitutional protection from the ap-
plication of religiously neutral laws.
Professor McConnell cites the history surrounding the conscientious-objector provision
as evidence that the framers indicated that "preferential treatment for religion in some
matters is desirable." McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 22. This may be true
and it may suggest that the framers intended that there be some room for legislatively
created exemptions without raising establishment clause concerns. Professor McConnell
parenthetically adds, however, that this history may indicate that preferred treatment for
religion is "sometimes mandatory." Id. On this point, as the foregoing suggests, he is on
less solid ground.
96. S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 366-68 (1972);
D. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 151-56 (1960).
The influence of natural law on constitutional notions of religious freedom may also be
found in some of the states' constitutions as they existed during the late 18th century.
Some of these constitutions provided that protection should be given to religious practices
not "inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State." E.g., 1 B. POORE. FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS. COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 383 (1972) (GA. CONsT. art. LVI) (1777); 2 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
1338 (1972) (N.Y. CONsT. art. XXXVIII (1777)). The limitation of constitutional protec-
tion to acts that do not offend peace and safety appears to reflect natural law philosophical
belief in the co-extensiveness of religious liberty and temporal authority. Professor McCon-
nell argues that this suggests a right of "religiously based exemptions from facially neutral
legislation .. " McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 56, at 151 n.26. However, this conclu-
sion is tenuous without a clearer definition of what was considered peace and safety. Given
that state laws at the time were primarily criminal and not regulatory, violations of secular
requirements might very well have been considered outside the public order.
97. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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v. Beason,99 for example, the Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that the Mormon practice of polygamy was religious. In the
words of the Court, "to call their advocacy [of polygamy] a tenet
of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind."9 9 Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected the Mormon protests against restrictions
on polygamy as not falling within the definition of religious exer-
cise protected by the first amendment. The Court stated that "[i]t
was never intended or supposed that the amendment could be in-
voked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of
acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society."' 0
As Reynolds and Davis suggest, there is little room in a natural-
law framework for the creation of a constitutionally compelled re-
ligious exemption for activities outside the social norm.
Deism and natural law were not, however, the only philoso-
phies that might have influenced the first amendment; evangelical
influence existed as well. 10' Nevertheless, there are additional rea-
sons which suggest that even those not sharing a deistic philoso-
phy would have had difficulty anticipating religious objection to
religiously neutral state provisions.
First of all, there were few religiously neutral state provisions
with which the religious practices could have been in conflict. The
regulatory state did not exist. There were no unemployment com-
pensation benefits programs that might have disadvantaged sab-
batarians'02 and no compulsory school programs that might have
compromised the Amish or their historical predecessors.' For a
98. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
99. Id. at 341-42.
100. Id. at 342.
101. The evangelical philosophy of Roger Williams exerted significant influence. See
M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 7 (1965) (As a codification of the meta-
phor "[t]he wall of separation between church and state," the first amendment embraced
Roger Williams's evangelical affirmation of the importance of protecting churches from
worldly corruption no less than it adopted the Enlightenment views of Thomas Jefferson.).
Professor Pepper argues that the religion clauses may have been a compromise between the
two competing philosophies. The establishment clause, he argues, represented the deist po-
sition that the state be secular, while the free exercise clause was the quid pro quo for the
evangelical school, thus providing extraordinary shelter for religion. Pepper, supra note 17,
at 305-06. Professor Pepper's theory, although plausible, is, as he recognizes, inconclusive
as to the exemption issue, in part because it assumes the framers were aware of the consti-
tutional-exemption issue.
102. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (South Carolina unem-
ployment compensation legislation disqualified applicant who failed to accept suitable work
because it would require working on the sabbath).
103. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (Wisconsin compulsory
school attendance law required Amish to keep their children in a formal education system
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conflict to occur, then, it would have had to arise within the state's
criminal law.
This conflict, in turn, was unlikely for a second reason. Al-
though there were varieties of religious beliefs at the end of the
eighteenth century, there was not a great disparity in the types of
religious practices. Rather, the culture of the United States in the
late eighteenth century was fairly homogeneous, being composed
almost entirely of Christian sects whose practices were unlikely to
violate non-religious societal norms.10 4 Thus, there existed neither
the practices nor the laws that would make a conflict between reli-
gious exercise and religiously neutral laws likely.
Finally, there is no suggestion, in any event, that the framers
conceived of a constitutionally mandated exemption. Article VI,
for example, bans the religious test.105 It does not create an ex-
emption. Those arguing for a textual interpretation in favor of the
constitutionally compelled exemption must also demonstrate that
the unique remedy of exemption is consistent with the framers'
constitutional purposes. The historical evidence, however, is lack-
ing. History, therefore, is no guide to the purported right to con-
stitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions from religiously
neutral laws of general applicability.
B. Equality
A second contention made by supporters of a free exercise
exemption is that the creation of such an exemption adds to,
rather than subtracts from, equality concerns. This argument con-
tends that the application of neutral regulations creates its own
inequality.106 For example, a Seventh-Day Adventist, who is not
entitled to receive unemployment compensation because she is un-
until the age of sixteen).
104. See T. CURRY, supra note 94, at 79 ("[The] consensus as to religious freedom
was firmly embedded in a Christian and Protestant world view. Colonial writers proclaimed
liberty of conscience, but they grounded that liberty in the unexamined assumption that the
legal systems of the time would uphold and maintain a Christian and Protestant State.").
105. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3.
106. See Note, Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1606, 1719 (1987) ("[l1n every instance, accommodation appears both to serve and to
undermine equality."); see also McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 8-13 (dis-
cussing the burden placed on religious adherents by "neutral" laws); Pepper, supra note
17, at 314 (majority inadvertently burdening minority through facially neutral laws). The
strongest defense of the free exercise clause as a provision assuring the protection of minor-
ity religions is found in Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: "A Turning
Point." 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217.
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available to work on Saturdays, is at a disadvantage with those
whose religious beliefs do not forbid Saturday employment and
who, if they are religiously forbidden from working on Sundays,
may already be protected by legislative exemption. Creating an
exemption for the sabbatarian therefore equalizes her rights with
those of other religious adherents. Creation of this exemption also
ensures that a religious majority, while never likely to place disa-
bilities on the exercise of its own beliefs, might "inadvertently"
inhibit the religious rights of minority groups.0 7 Professor
Tushnet has questioned the accuracy of this argument. As he
points out, there probably is no mythical majority intentionally
protecting its own religious beliefs and "inadvertently" placing
disabilities on the beliefs of others: "In a pluralistic society with
crosscutting group memberships, the overall distribution of bene-
fits and burdens is likely to be reasonably fair."'0 8
Yet, even aside from Tushnet's criticism, inequality among
religions is not the governing equality concern. Even if a special
exemption for religious adherents equalizes the effects of other-
wise neutral laws on all religious believers, it does not equalize the
effects of those laws on individuals presenting parallel secular ob-
jections. Again, those advocating a free exercise exemption for re-
ligious groups must convincingly argue that religious exercise is
special.
C. Pluralism
Some commentators also rely heavily on notions of pluralism
to support expanded free exercise protection. 0 9 The value in plu-
ralism has been succinctly stated by Justice Brennan: It is benefi-
cial to have diverse sub-groups within .society because "each group
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enter-
prise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.""'
107. Pepper, supra note 17, at 314.
108. Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante),
76 GEo. L.J. 1691, 1700 (1988) [hereinafter Tushnet, Emerging Principle].
109. E.g., McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 14-24 (arguing that accom-
modation of religion follows directly from an interpretation of the religion clauses based on
religious pluralism). While not relying heavily on pluralism, Professor Tushnet acknowl-
edges that pluralism supports accommodation. Tushnet, Emerging Principle, supra note
108, at 1699-1701.
110. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan J., concurring); see
also Van Patten, In the End is the Beginning: An Inquiry Into the Meaning of the Religion
Clauses, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 84 (1983) ("The diversity of private associations, including
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Actually, there are three separate values inherent in the plu-
ralistic model. The first is the capacity of religious groups to act
as mediating institutions between the individual and government.
Communal groups, such as religious organizations, "foster diver-
sity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the
power of the state." ''
The second value of religious pluralism is its capacity to pro-
vide moral principles that help mold the citizenry into the sort of
virtuous society that allows self-government to flourish."' In the
tradition of civic republicanism, religion imbues the people with
the sense of responsibility and veneration necessary for the repub-
lic to succeed." 3
The third value of pluralism is simply that it is desireable in
itself. Multiplicity of religion is arguably not only a buffer against
state power and a source of moral values in the populace, but also
a factor in cultural diversity.
The problem with the pluralism theory is not that it is mis-
guided. Indeed, its aims and structure are highly attractive. Its
deficiency is that it is not an argument for special protection for
religious exercise. The values inherent in pluralism are also ad-
vanced by the protection of non-religious groups.
First, secular mediating groups such as ethnic associations
and socio-political organizations also serve as buffers between the
individual and the state." 4 Religious groups are, after all, not the
religious associations, provides a balance in the extended republic against the domination of
any particular group." (footnote omitted)). For an excellent detailed discussion of religious
groups, see Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights,
1989 Wis. L. REV. 99.
111. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S 609, 619 (1984).
112. See Gedicks, supra note 110, at 161-62; McConnell, Accommodation, supra
note 9, at 17-20 (discussing religion as a source of public virtue); Tushnet, Religion, supra
note 9, at 735-37 (discussing religion as a source of moral responsibility and governmental
stability).
113. See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term: Foreward: Traces
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 17-36 (1986) (discussing republicanism in
American constitutional thought). According to Professor McConnell, the civic republican
conception that there should be a diversity of sects from which moral ideas could be gener-
ated shaped the vision of the framers of the religion clauses, particularly Madison. Accord-
ing to McConnell, "[Il]iberal political theory thus favored religion, but it did not favor any
one religion. [Rather], [i]t guaranteed religious freedom in the hope and expectation that
religious observance would flourish, and with it morality and self-restraint among the peo-
ple." McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 19-20. The values of religious plural-
ism are also discussed in M. MARTY, RELIGION AND REPUBLIC (1987).
114. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REv.
1001, 1034-35 (1983); see also Linder, Freedom of Ass'n After Roberts v. United States
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sole mediating institutions in society.115 Second, religion does not
lay claim to a monopoly in the inculcation of civic virtue. As Pro-
fessor Tushnet has explained, "[r] eligion may now be one of sev-
eral methods of inculcating civic virtue." 1 6 Finally, cultural diver-
sity is not solely the product of religious multiplicity. Other types
of heterogeneity - ethnic, lingual, and regional - enrich the cul-
ture as well." 7
The pluralist argument thus fails to establish why only reli-
gious groups, and not secular groups that share the same charac-
teristics, merit special treatment. In short, the pluralist argument
is either one for broad associational rights that include, but extend
beyond, religious affiliations to other types of societal sub-
groups,11 8 or it is an argument for the development of a constitu-
tional theory that assimilates community rights into its individual-
rights methodology." 9 The pluralist argument does not, however,
support special exemption for religion.
D. The Special Nature of Religion
Religion, some commentators contend, is not simply another
belief system. Unlike other types of beliefs, religion seeks a truth
and a morality that stem from divine authority. Accordingly, the
obligations religion places on its adherents transcend those im-
posed by temporal sources. In the words of Professor McConnell,
"religious claims - if true - are prior to and of greater dignity
than the claims of the state [and the individual] "120
As Professor Garvey explains, the belief in a transcendent au-
Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1880-81 (1984).
115. See, e.g., Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference
With Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 369-70 (1984) (socio-politi-
cal groups such as those based on an ethnic or political alliance also form intermediate
communities which may shield the individual from the state).
116. Tushnet, Emerging Principle, supra note 108, at 1696.
117. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion) ("[O]ur tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution
of diversity [at an academic institution] is substantial.").
118. See Garet, supra note 114, at 1034-35 ("[A] decision such as Yoder respects a
group right referred back to groupness or communality as its underlying claiming good.").
Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 N.W. U.L. REV. 68, 85-88
(1986) (arguing that a "right of cultural association," which would include national origin,
race, or religious affiliation, ought to be recognized).
119. See, e.g., Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at 736-38 (arguing that the republi-
can tradition can be invoked to "establish . . . a different balance between individualism
and community' [a balance that is] grounded in the Constitution.").
120. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 15.
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thority has significant ramifications for its adherents.'' If the law
of the state and the religious tenet differ, the religious adherent is
in the unwelcome position of being subject to conflicting duties.'22
This, in turn, leads to two unpleasant options. On the one hand,
the religious adherent may abandon her religious belief to follow
the dictates of state law. If so, she may incur a "special cruelty,"
particularly if the violation of the tenet is believed to have "ex-
tratemporal consequences. On the other hand, she may choose
to act in allegiance to her religious faith and violate state law.
This choice leads to the equally unsatisfactory result of civil diso-
bedience and its accompanying social costs, including "dispropor-
tionate investment of enforcement resources, and loss of respect
for law," as well as. potential earthly punishment for the
believer. 24
These concerns are indisputably serious; however, none are
unique to religion. Conflicting duties occur anytime one's beliefs
conflict with those of the state, whether those beliefs are religious
or not. Some beliefs, like those underlying an individual's objec-
tion to the draft, may be moral or political.'25 Other beliefs bring-
ing the individual in conflict with the state may be based on more
personal concerns, including those akin to privacy rights in inti-
mate association protected under the due process clause. The
same Board of Unemployment Compensation that denied unem-
ployment benefits to Eddie Thomas for failing to work in an
armaments factory also denied benefits to a person whose failure
to be available for work was due to strong convictions about pa-
rental obligations.'26
121. Garvey, supra note 7, at 779. Not all religions, of course, adopt the notion of
transcendental authority. See, e.g., Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amend-
ment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 832 (1984) (stating that some religions
- Buddhism, for example - have nothing "to do with the concept of a creator God").
122. Garvey, supra note 7, at 794-95.
123. Choper, Defining "'Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv.
579, 599; see also Garvey, supra note 7, at 793 (the fear of extratemporal consequences as
a cause of suffering "provides an explanation for the uniqueness of religious liberty").
124. Garvey, supra note 7,-at 795-96.
125. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970) (objections to killing in
war based upon ethical and moral beliefs); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370
(1968) (opposition to draft based on political and social objection to war).
126. Gray v. Dobbs House, 357 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) ("Although
parental obligations no doubt constitute good personal reason for termination of employ-
ment, they nevertheless lack the objective nexus with employment envisioned by the Act.");
cf. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (identifying
intimate personal relationships as a source of constitutional protection).
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The conclusion that there is a special suffering associated
with the violation of a religious tenet is also overbroad at best.
Not all religious beliefs are held with equal fervor by the religious
adherent, nor are religious beliefs necessarily more deeply felt
than secular beliefs. A person who has a secular, moral objection
to killing in war and a religious objection to working on the Sab-
bath might well suffer a greater psychic harm in being forced to
kill than in being forced to work.
Avoiding civil disobedience is also not a persuasive reason to
single out religion for special benefits. One reason, of course, is
that sacrificing important governmental interests because of fears
of non-compliance raises its own concerns.' 27 More importantly,
the problem of civil disobedience is again not unique to religion.
Professor Garvey has drawn a compelling illustration of the harm
that might have been caused if Wisconsin chose to arrest the
members of the Amish community who refused the requirements
of compulsory education; however, even Garvey concludes that
concerns of civil disobedience alone do not set religious belief
apart from other belief systems.'2 8
Professor Garvey ultimately concludes that what separates
religion from non-religion is that the former "is a lot like in-
sanity." 2 9 According to Garvey, this conclusion has two aspects.
The first is cognitive. Garvey asserts that the process of under-
standing reality through religious beliefs is dissimilar to develop-
ing that understanding through practical reasoning - the cogni-
tive process by which reality is generally understood in the
society.' 30 The second aspect is volitional. The religious believer is
compelled by his belief to engage in certain activities. He there-
fore lacks the will in the same way an insane person lacks the will
127. As Gail Merel has warned:
Government is ultimately premised upon the subordination of individual con-
science to majority rule. Safeguards can, of course, be provided for minority
rights, and checks may be placed on purely majoritarian rule; in the end, how-
ever, government functions by the passage of a single law, the making of a final
decision, the determination of a particular course of action. To permit special
exceptions for activities actually singled out by the first amendment is, in itself,
administratively difficult. But to protect the exercise of conscience in all things
would effectively render every citizen, at his own option, a law unto himself.
Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion
Under the First Amendment, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 805, 812 (1978) (citations omitted).
128. Garvey, supra note 7, at 797.
129. Id. at 798.
130. Id. ("The. . .problem of understanding natural events in a way wholly at odds
with the rest of society occurs frequently in a religious context.")
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to conform his practices to societal expectations. 131 For this rea-
son, Garvey suggests, exempting the religious adherent is
appropriate.
There are two deficiencies in Garvey's thesis. First, it is not
at all clear that religion is the only belief system that bases its
understanding of the world upon a cognition other than that
achieved through practical reasoning. Most other types of beliefs
and moral values have non-rational components. Indeed, the con-
tentions that practical reasoning leads to an understanding of real-
ity and that morality may be understood through rational
processes are themselves ultimately based on no more than their
own non-rational, a priori assumptions. 32
Second, it is unclear that, even if lack of volition underlies
religious belief, the appropriate response is to defer to this non-
volitional understanding by creating special exemptions. There is,
after all, a presumption of free will that underlies the principle of
individual freedom expressed throughout the Constitution, and
there is a principle of voluntariness which specifically underlies
American religion and the religion clauses. 33 The analogy to in-
sanity alone does not support the free exercise exemption.
Nevertheless, although no one factor conclusively establishes
a special status for religion and religious belief for constitutional
law purposes, it may be, as Garvey suggests, that the aggregation
of a number of factors leads to the conclusion that religion is enti-
131. Id. at 801 ("[F]or the claimant, there is no question of choice. We protect their
freedom, then, because they are not free.").
132. See generally A. CAMUS, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1i9 (J.
O'Brien trans. 1969) (attacking the purported certainty of rationality and examining
human existence in a world whose understanding is beyond human reasoning); R. RORTY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160-75 (1982) (detailed discussions about the doctrines of
pragmatism, relativism, and irrationalism); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9, 30-38 (1985) (discussing the fallacy that.rational
consideration will ultimately lead to an objectively correct result in decision procedures).
133. See, e.g., M. MARTY, supra note 113, at 46 ("Theological exceptions abound,
but the psychology and sociology of American religion strongly reinforce the voluntaryistic
outlook."); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 81
HARV. L. REv. 513, 517 (1968) ("Religious voluntarism, of course, is an important aspect
of the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the free exercise clause. But a broad interpre-
tation of the establishment clause also gives vent to the social dimension of this value
...."); Sandel, supra note 10, at 608 ("[T]he individual freedom of conscience protected
by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at
all . . . . [Rieligious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful. ... (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added))).
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tied to special protection.13 4 As will be shown in the next section,
however, the constitutional difficulties created by special protec-
tion for religion militate against the conclusion that special treat-
ment for religion is constitutionally compelled.
III. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
COMPELLED FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION
A. Avoiding The Sincerity and Definition Inquiry
Creating constitutionally compelled exemptions under the
free exercise clause necessitates inquiry into the sincerity and re-
ligiosity of the religious claim. This inquiry poses its own threat to
religious values. 135 On the other hand, abandoning the free exer-
cise exemption obviates the need for defining religion in free exer-
cise cases 136 and wholly avoids judicial inquiries into sincerity, ex-
cept in cases involving legislatively created exemptions. 7
Avoiding religious inquiry thus promotes religious liberty.
The problems inherent in defining religion and the harms def-
inition creates for free exercise purposes are, of course, apparent.
As Professor Stanley Ingber has argued:
The danger in defining religion lies in the possibility of violating
the very purpose of the religion clauses by proposing a definition
that excludes non-traditional religious beliefs from the ambit of
the first amendment. To define religion is to limit it ....
[A]ny attempt to fulfill this mandate risks a delineation of a
religious orthodoxy.' 38
This exclusion of non-traditional beliefs is one of the most
serious threats to religious values. As Justice Stevens has argued,
evaluating the merits of religious claims creates "[t]he risk that
government approval of some and disapproval of others will be
134. Garvey, supra note 7, at 794.
135. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 5, at 622 (noting that, in attempting to set stan-
dards for religious exemption and necessarily defining "religion" in the process, certain
religious groups will be excluded and freedom of religion will thereby be harmed); Heins,
supra note 6, at 166 (arguing that "to allow adjudication of the verity of beliefs would be
to oppress the weaker or less popular faiths by treating them differently from the more
popular ones, thereby 'establishing' the latter").
136. A definition of religion will still be required in establishment clause cases. See,
e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (teaching of transcendental meditation
in public schools held to constitute establishment of religion).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (defining religion for
purposes of conscientious objector provision in the Selective Service Act).
138. Ingber, supra note 10, at 241.
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perceived as favoring one religion over another is an important
risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude." 13 9 Ste-
vens's position is supported by two of the Court's most famous
pronouncements on the illegitimacy of legal determination of or-
thodoxy. In Watson v. Jones,4" the Court stated that "[t]he law
knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect."1"1 In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,'42 it declared, "[if there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion."1 43
Similar problems exist with sincerity. If protection of reli-
gious practice means anything, it means that the government can-
not reject as false particular religious creeds. Yet how can one
judge the sincerity of an individual's belief without judging the
reasonableness of the belief? As Justice Jackson argued in United
States v. Ballard, the problem is essentially insoluble. 144
Moreover, there is difficulty even in the act of inquiring into
an individual's religious beliefs, since such an inquiry raises the
troublesome spectre of state inquisition into religious motivation
and governmental attempts to impeach professed religious convic-
tions. According to Chief Justice Warren: "[A] state-conducted
inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs [is] a
practice which a State might believe would itself run afoul of the
spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees.' ' 14*
It is, thus, not an overstatement to suggest that avoiding the
sincerity and religiosity inquiries might alone support abandoning
the free exercise exemption. When one combines the possibility
that any activity could potentially be characterized as religious
with the conclusion that there are no appropriate ways to distin-
guish legitimate from illegitimate religious assertions, the case
against expanding free exercise protection becomes more compel-
ling." 6 Indeed, this concern alone has motivated Justice Stevens
139. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
140. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
141. Id. at 728.
142. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
143. Id. at 642 (1943).
144. 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
145. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
146. Professor Pepper states that "[lurking behind the inconsistency in the last
twenty-five years of Supreme Court free exercise doctrine may be an unwillingness to con-
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to suggest placing a virtually "insurmountable burden" on the free
exercise claimant seeking an exemption from a neutral law of gen-
eral applicability.'47
More interestingly, this concern with extensive inquiries into
religious beliefs has led some of the strongest proponents of ex-
pansive free exercise protection to offer surprisingly limited stan-
dards for religious claims to special exemption. Professor McCon-
nell would vindicate such claims primarily when the state has
already employed a mechanism for "case-by-case determinations
of a subjective nature by responsible officials, or [when] the reli-
gious accommodation- can be reduced to a simple objective rule
that can be administered at the operational level." ' 14 8 Concern for
the sincerity and religiosity issues has led Professor Lupu to con-
struct a threshold inquiry into what constitutes a burden on free
exercise, in part, to weed out free exercise claims before reaching
the sincerity and religiosity determinations.'49 Professor Pepper
refuses to shy away from the sincerity inquiry but ultimately
adopts a definition for deciding what qualifies as "religion" that
expands the understanding of "religion" to protect "a core area of
liberty" termed "conscience."' 150 The merits of these positions will
be discussed below.' 5' The point is that even free exercise exemp-
tion advocates recognize that powerful arguments in favor of the
protection of religion and religious belief support the elimination
of the constitutionally compelled free exercise exemption.
B. Elimination of Favoritism for Religious Belief and Exercise
The second argument against the free exercise claim for ex-
emption is that it seeks a favoritism for religion that itself raises
serious constitutional concerns. The concern with such favoritism
is most evident when the exemption sought is from regulatory
measures that directly affect the dissemination of ideas. The ex-
emption of religious proponents vests them with a distinct compet-
itive advantage over their secular counterparts. For example, as-
sume a rule that restricts all solicitations at a state fair to fixed-
front the likelihood of insincere claims." Pepper, supra note 17, at 325.
147. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
148. McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 56, at 156.
149. Lupu, Burdens, supra note 43, at 953-60.
150. Pepper, supra note 17, at 331-32.
151. See infra notes 203-22 and accompanying text.
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booth locations.1 52 If a religious organization, because of the reli-
gious belief of its members, is exempted from the rule and accord-
ingly is allowed to engage in unrestricted face-to-face solicitation,
it will be better able to raise money, expound its philosophy, and
seek converts than will the non-religious groups that remain re-
stricted to fixed locations. Thus, given a religious and a secular
organization of similar size and budget, the exempted religious
group will be better placed than its secular counterpart to raise
funds and exert its influence - a significant advantage given the
Supreme Court's canon that "money is speech."'153 The special ex-
emption, in effect, grants to those advancing religious views more
power than their secular counterparts.
This favoritism toward religious organizations, of course, vio-
lates the central principle in speech jurisprudence that every idea
has equal dignity in the competition for acceptance in the market-
place of ideas.154 Providing greater protection for religious speak-
ers suggests, in direct opposition to this principle, that there exists
a constitutional hierarchy in which religious ideas occupy a higher
position than secular ideas. This preferred status undercuts the
"equal liberty of expression guaranteed by the first
amendment.' 55
152. These are substantially the facts of Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
153. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); see also Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 21 (expenditures of money are
themselves "speech"). For a criticism of this position, see Wright, Politics and the Consti-
tution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976) ("Nothing in the first amend-
ment . . . commits us to the dogma that money is speech.").
154. Karst, supra note 27, at 20, 23-26 ("The principle of equal liberty of expression
underlies important purposes of the first amendment." These purposes are "self-govern-
ment," "the search for truth," and "self-expression and equal dignity.").
155. Id. at 26; see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But above all
else, the first amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); see also Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 & 267 n.5 (1982) (same); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("[A] constitutionally permissible time, place,
or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of
speech." (footnote omitted)); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975)
(same); cf. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 83 (1978) [hereinafter Stone, Restric-
tions] (questioning whether the Supreme Court should apply the same standard of review
used to test content-based restrictions defined "in terms of a particular viewpoint, idea, or
item of information" to test those defined "in terms of expression about an entire subject").
See generally Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEo. L.J. 727, 727 (1980) (" '[A]bove all else, the first amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter
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Not surprisingly, the Court's reliance on equality-of-ideas no-
tions has consistently led it to reject claims under the free exercise
clause in circumstances where cognizable speech claims would be
denied. 56 For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,157 in rejecting
a claim for a greater right of free exercise, the Court had this to
say:
If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience
a broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be
doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First
[Amendment] can be given higher place than the others. All
have preferred position in our basic scheme. All are interwoven
there together. Differences there are, in them and in the modes
appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the char-
ter's prime place because they have unity in their human sources
and functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive
faith and reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not al-
ways thought. But in the everyday business of living, secular or
otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find inseparable
expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be altogether parted
in law more than in life. 58
Speech clause problems, however, are not the only concerns.
Favoritism for religious speech over non-religious speech is also
antithetical to establishment clause policies. Singling out religion
for special treatment raises establishment concerns in any case,
but as the recent Texas Monthly case attests, the difficulty is ex-
acerbated when the special treatment concerns speech.' 59 Part of
or its content.' That, in a nutshell, is the principle of content neutrality." (citation omit-
ted)); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv.
113, 114 (1981) (examining "the nature of content discrimination" and the appropriate
standard of judicial review); Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination,
68 VA. L. REv. 203 (1982) (examining the doctrine of content-neutrality); Stone, Content
Regulation And The First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 189 (1983) ("Per-
haps the most intriguing feature of contemporary first amendment doctrine is the increas-
ingly invoked distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on
expression.").
156. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (no violation of free exercise clause where Minnesota Agricultural Society
rule required members of International Society for Krishna Consciousness to confine solici-
tation activities and sales and distribution of religious materials to a fixed location); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (no violation of free.exercise clause where Massa-
chusetts child-labor laws precluded Jehovah's Witness from supplying minor girl with reli-
gious periodicals).
157. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
158. Id. at 164.
159. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 905 (1989) ("Texas' sales tax
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the underlying theory of freedom of speech is that it creates the
discourse necessary for self-government.160  The establishment
clause, however, imposes a unique limitation on direct religious
influence over government that does not apply to non-religious
sources.16' Although religion undoubtedly should play a part in
the political process,' 62 it is untenable to assert that religion ought
exemption for religious publications violates the First Amendment. ); id. (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (the case "at issue touches upon values that underlie three different clauses
of the First Amendment: the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the
Press Clause. As indicated by the [four] different opinions issued in this case today, harmo-
nizing these several values is not an easy task.").
160. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 96 (1960) ("It is that prohibition
[against interference with people's right to participate in electoral activities that] the first
amendment expresses in its guarding of the freedom of speech, press, assembly, and peti-
tion."); see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
Li. 1, 26 (1971) (The framers "indicated a value when they said that speech in some sense
was special and when they wrote a Constitution providing for representative democracy, a
form of government that is meaningless without open and vigorous debate about officials
and their policies."); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 208 ("The [First] Amendment has a
'central meaning' - a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot func-
tion. ... ); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,
256 ("[T]here are many forms of thought and expression within the range of human com-
munications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human
values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, as far as possible, a ballot
should express. These . . .must suffer no abridgement of their freedom."); Stone, Restric-
tions, supra note 155, at 101 (one of the purposes of free speech is to allow the "market-
place of ideas" to function, and it is this process which is "essential to the effective opera-
tion of a self-governing society").
161. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (while political debate is
necessary to our system of government, the establishment clause was intended to protect
the democratic system from "debate and division" along religious lines); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("What is at stake [in the
establishment clause cases] as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of
government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."); Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and
division is normally a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations, political di-
vision on religious lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to
forestall.").
162. For support for this proposition, see M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW:
A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY 7 (1988) (arguing that moral beliefs, including those religious in
character, must be a principle ground for political deliberation); Gaffney, Political Divi-
siveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 205, 224-34 (1980) (arguing that the "political
divisiveness" test, which allows courts to invalidate legislation that might create contro-
versy among religious groups, is bad public policy); Gedicks & Hendrix, Democracy, Au-
tonomy, and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1579, 1587 (1987) (arguing for "reintegrating serious religious thought and belief
into our culture, particularly our political culture, as legitimate predicates for public ac-
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to have special advantage in the public debate. Giving a competi-
tive advantage to religious speech in the marketplace of ideas and
in the discourse that leads to self-governance turns the establish-
ment clause on its head.
Perhaps because of the speech and establishment clause
problems, the consensus is that when speech and religion overlap,
special protection for free exercise claims need not be main-
tained. 16 3 The primary concern is what is to be protected. Yet, to
find the scope of free exercise broader than the scope of free
speech ultimately leads to the same kinds of concerns.
The Thomas case, for example, involved a person who ob-
jected to working in an armaments factory. 64 Because the per-
son's objection was based on religious belief, the Court found it
constitutionally protected. The Court was equally clear, however,
that if the claim were based on secular moral grounds, it would be
denied. 16 5 But why should the objection on religious grounds to
working in an armaments factory be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection, while an objection to the same work based on moral
grounds be denied? A similar problem exists in Yoder.'66 Why
should the Amish be exempted from Wisconsin compulsory school
education while other groups that desire to have their children
free of public school influence not be entitled to the exclusion?' 67
tion"); Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Pro-
tecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1011 (1985-86) [herein-
after, Greenawalt, Rationality] ("[P]eople should feel as free to rely on religious
perspectives as on other perspectives that help determine political positions.").
163. See, e.g., McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 56, at 149 (giving as an example
of neutral protection of religion a case in which religious speakers seeking access to public
parks needed only to ask for the same access accorded any other speaker); Pfeffer, supra
note 28, at 1116 ("[T]he Court [will not necessarily] accept a free exercise claim when in
a similar fact situation it has rejected free speech claims."). But see Greenawalt, Religion
as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 777 (1984) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Religion] ("Any assumption that the broader liberty of conscience derived
from the free speech clause will always encompass a valid free exercise claim is definitely
mistaken in the area of communication and very likely wrong in the area of belief." (foot-
note omitted)); Pfeffer, supra note 28, at 1115 (arguing that after Yoder the free exercise
clause appealed "to have achieved elevated status and more than equal significance in the
scheme of first amendment protection.")
164. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
165. Id. at 713 ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause.").
166. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
167. The Yoder Court specifically stated that a parallel non-religious claim would be
denied. Id. at 215 ("A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed
as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular
considerations.").
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If only the religion claim is protected, religious beliefs are
accorded a more favorable position in the constitutional hierarchy
than are secular beliefs. However, as we have already seen, such a
hierarchy is constitutionally suspect, since it denies religious and
secular beliefs equal constitutional dignity.'
Moreover, as with expressive religious activity, favored treat-
ment raises concerns of political effect. Religious beliefs do not
exist in a vacuum and, even when they are not political in them-
selves, they can evolve to political dimensions.6 9 In addition to the
obviously political and religious issues of abortion and capital pun-
ishment, consider also for example, as Professor Greenawalt has
done, for example, the religious influence on such issues as animal
rights and the environment. 170 Indeed, the infusion of religious be-
liefs into the political process is an important, necessary, and per-
haps even unavoidable part of democratic decision-making.'
Similarly, as has been noted in civic-republicanism theory, religion
and religious belief promote the values in the citizenry that are
necessary for responsible public decision-making. 72 Religious be-
lief, in short, cannot and should not be segregated from its politi-
cal effect.
If this is so, however, then freeing religious exercise from
neutral strictures gives religious beliefs an unfair advantage over
competing value systems in the political marketplace. If religious
beliefs are subsidized in a way secular beliefs are not (as in
Thomas) or if they are insulated from the societal forces that rou-
tinely challenge any belief system (as in Yoder or as was re-
quested by the plaintiffs in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education,73 the public school textbooks case), they become rein-
168. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
169. See Note, supra note 2, at 369 ("Any religion-based exemption [from law] ar-
guably has effects outside the religious territory.").
170. See Greenawalt, Religion, supra note 163, at 1020.
171. See sources cited supra note 163.
172. See McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 19 ("It was accordingly
widely thought by the founders that republican self-government could not succeed unless
religion continued to foster a moral sense in the people."); Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9,
at 702 (suggesting "that a reconstituted law of religion might draw on the republican tradi-
tion to alleviate existing intellectual disarray by providing to nonbelievers as well as believ-
ers a view of the law that affirms the connectedness that religious belief mobilizes and that
liberalism denies").
173. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988) (plaintiffs
argued "that they have sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the values taught or
indicated by the reading textbooks [used in the public school system,] and that it is a
violation of the religious beliefs and convictions of the plaintiff students to be required to
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forced with an artificial vitality. This favoring of religious ideas
runs counter to both establishment clause concerns with religious
domination of the political process and speech clause concerns
with the need for equality in the marketplace of ideas.
Finally, the creation of constitutionally compelled protection
for religious beliefs is also problematic because it judicially legiti-
mizes the religious belief in comparison to the non-religious. The
moral authority of the Court is placed, in effect, behind the reli-
gious belief. 174 In defending special free exercise protection, Pro-
Tessor Ira Lupu has stated the issue well: "Free exercise exemp-
tions from general regulatory statutes are a form of constitutional
tribute to individual acts of faith."'17 5 Lupu makes the statement
approvingly; however, the claim that religion merits special tribute
seems ill-founded in light of establishment and equality-of-ideas
concerns. This claim also appears to contradict the seminal princi-
ples announced in Watson v. Jones176 and West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette.177 Since the law cannot promote
orthodoxy in the truth of belief, so it would seem, the law should
not support orthodoxy in the type of belief.
C. Doctrinal Concerns
Abandoning the free exercise claim for exemption is also sup-
ported by doctrinal concerns. As we have seen, the Court's at-
tempts to grapple with Sherbert's doctrinal support of exemptions
have been chaotic. 78 The reason for this may be that doctrinal
inconsistency is an inevitable product of the Sherbert methodol-
ogy. As Justice Scalia has explained, the systematic use of a com-
pelling interest test, taken seriously, would necessarily create
havoc in a society comprised of diverse religious beliefs.' 79 It is
read the books").
174. See generally M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ix (1982) (questioning "the legitimacy of constitutional policymaking (by the judi-
ciary) that goes beyond the value judgments established by the framers of the written
Constitution (extraconstitutional policymaking).").
175. Lupu, Keeping the Faith, supra note 4, at 769.
176. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), quoted in supra text accompanying note 141.
177. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), quoted in supra text accompanying note 143.
178. See supra notes 40-75 and accompanying text; cf. Kurland, The Irrelevance of
the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court,
24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978) (arguing that the Constitution has been irrelevant to judgments
of the Supreme Court in the areas of freedom of religion and separation of church and
state.)
179. Smith II, 110 S. Ct .... 58 U.S.L.W. 4433, 4436 (1990).
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therefore not surprising that the cases have commonly denied free
exercise relief even while ostensibly applying Sherbert's standards.
Certainly, doctrinal clarity is not an end in itself and should
be abandoned if the doctrine in question does not adequately serve
its purposes. However, the argument that free exercise claims for
exemption should be denied and relief granted solely under the
speech clause does not seriously limit protection of free exercise
activity. The most stringent constitutional standard of review, af-
ter all, is the one applied in speech cases.180
Any curtailment in the protection of religious exercise under
this theory would occur only in the scope of which activities are
covered. Even here, however, it is important not to overstate the
significance of the exclusion. As we have seen, protection for reli-
gious liberty has been quite extensive under the speech clause, en-
compassing essential forms of religious exercise such as prayer,
proselytism, and even some forms of religious conscientious objec-
tion.1 81 Moreover, other claims that have been litigated exclusively
as free exercise cases might easily be construed as involving pro-
tected speech activity as well. For example, in Bob Jones Univer-
sity v. United States, 8 the petitioners' claim that they should be
entitled to tax-exempt status parallels the speech claim of the tax-
payer in Speiser v. Randall,'83 who successfully argued that he
could not be denied favorable tax treatment simply because he did
not sign a loyalty oath. Simcha Goldman's184 claim that his reli-
gious principles required him to wear religious headgear while
serving in the military might have been successfully characterized
as speech.' 8 5 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,'86 the Court even recognized a student's decision
to wear black arm bands as a mode of free expression.
Of course, the fact that potential free exercise claims can be
180. Professor Laurence Tribe characterizes the right of speech as the "Constitu-
tion's most majestic guarantee." L. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 785.
181. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
182. 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (non-profit private schools that prescribe and en-
force facially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine may be
denied favorable tax treatment).
183. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
184. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (reasoning that the First Amend-
ment does not require the military to accommodate those who wished to wear yarmulkes).
185. Curiously enough, Justice Stevens characterized Goldman's right to wear a yar-
mulke, in part, in speech terms. For Stevens, it was an "eloquent rebuke to the ugliness of
anti-Semitism." Id. at 510-11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
186. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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recharacterized as speech claims does not mean that they will be
successful. A military officer who chose to wear a black arm band
as a protest against war would probably not be entitled to an ex-
emption from uniform requirements. The critical point, to repeat,
is that the breadth of religious activity covered under the speech
clause is already expansive and to a large degree includes the core
of religious exercise. It is therefore only a modest loss in the scope
of protection for religious activities that need be measured against
the gains created by avoiding the problems inherent in exempting
only religious, activity.
It is even possible that some loss in the scope of protection
could be remedied by an expansion of the parameters of the
speech clause. Such expansion, however, even if moderate, is, as
Professor Tushnet asserts, unlikely given the current composition
of the Supreme Court.187 Yet, since much of religious ritual is
intended to convey ideas, it would not be too radical a step to
protect such activity as symbolic speech.' 88 Similarly, protection
for the conscientious objection of both religious and non-religious
persons could be realized under existing speech precedent.' 89
187. Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at 718. It also may be ill-advised to character-
ize all religious activity as speech, since legislatively created exemptions for religion might
then be suspect under a content-neutral speech analysis. See infra text accompanying note
202.
188. As Professor Ingber writes, "[m]ost religious rituals, rites, or ceremonies...
are likely to be recognized and protected as symbolic conduct." Ingber, supra note 10, at
244 n.61 (citation omitted). He correctly cautions, however, that the right of speech is not
implicated every time a person engaging in an activity "intends thereby to express an
idea." Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
189. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text for an account of cases in which
rights of conscience have been protected under the speech clause.
Several other cases suggest, however, that matters involving secular conscience may be
protected under the rubric of religion. In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), a
claimant sought conscientious-objection exemption status from the draft based on his moral
and ethical beliefs. The Court held that he was entitled to exemption under section 60) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act, although the statute authorized exemp-
tion only for those professing a religious objection to war. Id. at 340-43. Of similar effect is
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), in which the Court recognized the right to
refuse to take a religious oath on grounds of non-belief to be constitutionally protected
under the free exercise clause.
Finally, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,
450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court, under the free exercise clause, protected a Jehovah's Wit-
ness who objected to working in an armaments factory but was unable to articulate the
nature of his religious objection. The Court protected the claim although there was evi-
dence that the tenets of the Witness's faith did not bar this employment, and the Indiana
Supreme Court had concluded the claimant's objection was based on non-religious grounds.
Id. at 719.
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Nevertheless, even if freedom of speech were expanded, activ-
ities protected under this expansively interpreted clause would not
necessarily lead to the same protection in result as if only reli-
gious exercise were protected. This is because the greater the
range of activity for which constitutional protection is sought, the
greater becomes the state interest in restricting that activity. 90
For example, although a state's interest in preventing overcrowd-
ing or fraud might not be severely compromised by the existence
of eighteen members of a religious sect engaging in wandering so-
licitation at a state fair, its interest would be seriously compro-
mised if those allowed to engage in that activity included all per-
sons representing other groups protected by the speech clause,
including political parties, other religions, and social-advocacy
groups.' A court would, therefore, be more likely, when faced
with the smaller class containing only religious claimants, to inval-
idate the state restriction.
However, this consideration only points to another of the
many absurdities created by the free exercise exemption. The con-
clusion that a right to engage in a religious activity is more likely
to prevail in the balancing equation when it implicates only free
exercise (and not speech) leads to a startling conclusion: Because
activities at the core of religion, such as prayer, worship, and the
dissemination of ideas, are expressive,' 92 they are less likely to be
constitutionally vindicated under the current balancing test than
are non-expressive activities of the periphery of religion. 193 There
190. See generally F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 134-35
(1982).
[I]t is important to recognize not only the distinction but also the relationship
between the strength of a right and the scope of a right . . . .The scope of a
right is its range, the activities it reaches . . . .The strength of a right is its
ability to overcome opposing interests (or values, or other rights) within its
scope.").
Id.
191. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981) ("[Tlhe inquiry must involve not only ISKCON, but also all other organiza-
tions that would be entitled to distribute, sell, or solicit."). In Heffron, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court had originally upheld the right of the Hare Krishnas to engage in peripatetic
solicitation at the Minnesota State Fair primarily because there were so few members of
the sect present and the state's interest in preventing congestion and fraud was not severely
threatened. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d
79 (Minn. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
192. See L. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1247 n.36 ("[T]he right to disseminate ideas
lies at the core of religious practice."); Galanter, supra note 106, at 274 ("[B]elief, prayer,
and worship . . . comprise . . .the central and essential core of religion.").
193. Compare Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
is no coherent purpose served by this result. 94
D. Legislative Exemptions for Religion - A Cautionary Note
The previous section demonstrates that establishment and
speech concerns lead to the rejection of the constitutionally based
free exercise exemption. It therefore raises the issue of whether
legislative exemptions for religious activity are unconstitutional as
well.195 Although this Article does not attempt to provide an in-
depth analysis of the constitutionality of legislative exemptions, a
brief response to the contention that a rejection of constitutionally,
based exemptions requires invalidation of legislative religious ex-
emptions is in order.
The first issue centers on establishment. The arguments
against constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions de-
pend, in part, on anti-establishment policies. These arguments do
1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (speech right to convene prayer
group on public school property denied) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(free exercise right to receive unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to state stat-
ute upheld despite religiously based unavailability for work).
194. Treating free exercise claims as expression may not entirely eliminate the con-
stitutionally compelled exemption. In extraordinarily limited circumstances, the speech
clause has been interpreted as requiring exemptions from otherwise neutral laws. Specifi-
cally, exemptions have been required from the application of disclosure requirements to
unpopular groups on the theory that disclosure might open the group's membership or busi-
ness contacts to reprisals and harassment. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 100-01 (1982) (Ohio Campaign Expense reporting law requiring
political candidates to report contributors and recipients held not to apply to Socialist
Workers Party because of probability of harassment and reprisal); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (NAACP's membership lists protected from state scrutiny
because of past public hostility and reprisal).
The purpose behind the free speech exemption is to assure that controversial ideas are
not driven from the marketplace. See Stone & Marshall, supra note 3, at 613 ("The poten-
tial to drive an unpopular 'minor' party out of existence is so severe that extraordinary
measures are warranted to avoid that result."). Accordingly, the standards for this exemp-
tion are extremely stringent - they demand a showing that without the exemption, the
organization's existence would be threatened. Id.
195. Some answer to this issue might be found in Smith II, 110 S. Ct. - , 58
U.S.L.W. 4433 (1990), where the Court heartily endorsed the availability of legislative
exemptions even as it was cutting back on constitutionally compelled exemptions. Id. at
., 58 U.S.L.W. at 4438. In practice though, the issue of the constitutionality of statu-
tory exemptions for religion and religious activity has had mixed results before the Su-
preme Court. Compare Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption from Civil Rights Act of 1964
allowing certain types of religious discrimination by religious employers upheld) and Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (Selective Service Act exemption for conscien-
tious objection upheld) with Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (sales
tax exemption for religious publications invalidated).
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not, however, call for the invalidation of legislatively created ex-
emptions under the establishment clause. In certain cases, estab-
lishment clause concerns might inform free exercise analysis and,
conversely, free exercise concerns may inform establishment anal-
ysis without either provision being violated. Professor McConnell
is correct when he asserts that there is room between the two
clauses for permissible government action.196 Moreover, the estab-
lishment inquiry asks a very different question than does free ex-
ercise; specifically, establishment asks whether the challenged gov-
ernment action connotes the endorsement of religion. 197
Legislative exemptions from certain types of regulation do not im-
ply this endorsement as readily as do affirmative grants or
subsidies.1 98
This is not to suggest that legislative exemptions should be
immune from establishment clause review. The Court has indi-
cated, for example, that an "unyielding weighting" of a state pro-
vision in favor of religion may raise establishment concerns.1 99
Statutory exemptions from regulations directly affecting the dis-
semination of ideas or otherwise allowing religious groups to dis-
proportionately extend their "worldly influence" may also be
particularly suspect under establishment analysis.200 These estab-
196. McConnell, Accommodations, supra note 9, at 3 ("[B]etween the accommoda-
tions compelled by the Free Exercise Clause and the benefits to religion prohibited by the
Establishment Clause there exists a class of permissible government actions toward reli-
gion, which have as their purpose and effect the facilitation of religious liberty.").
197. See Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 495, 497 (1986). For a criticism of the "no endorsement test,"
see Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement Test", 86 MicH. L. REV. 266 (1987) ("[T]he 'no endorsement' test
is riddled with analytical flaws that can only compound confusion and inconsistency af-
flicting the current establishment doctrine.").
198. See Laycock, Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1416 (1981) ("The state does not support or establish religion by leaving it alone."); Mar-
shall & Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause,
47 OHIo ST. L.J. 293, 329-30 (1986) (exemptions for religious organizations may be an
appropriate accommodation of church and, therefore, not unconstitutional).
199. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (Connecticut statute
that provided an absolute right to sabbath observers not to work on the sabbath violated
the establishment clause because the primary effect was to advance a particular religious
practice).
200. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 996 (1974). In this regard, Judge J. Skelly Wright's observation in addressing a claim
that religious broadcasters should be exempt from FCC anti-discrimination requirements is
noteworthy: "[S]ponsorship is what this exemption accomplishes. It is a sure formula for
concentrating and vastly extending the worldly influence of those religious sects having the
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lishment limitations on legislative exemptions exist, however, irre-
spective of the specific arguments advanced in this Article.
The conclusion that free exercise is not independent from
speech has more serious implications for review of legislative ex-
emptions under the speech clause. If religious activity is speech,
favorable treatment for religious activity would presumably vio-
late the content-neutrality requirements of the speech clause. For
example, if the hiring and firing of employees is considered sym-
bolic speech, the Title VII exemption from liability of religious
'employers in certain hiring and firing decisions could be construed
as a content-based regulation. The Title VII exemption might,
therefore, be unconstitutional under the speech clause, despite be-
ing constitutional under the establishment clause."'
On the other hand, this concern may be overstated. There is
no absolute prohibition against statutorily exempting certain
speech from government restrictions on expression. For example,
in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington20 2 the
Court held that the exclusion of tax-exempt veterans' organiza-
tions from the lobbying restrictions imposed on other tax-exempt
organizations was not an invalid, content-based regulation, even
though the exemption, in effect, granted the veterans' groups a
lobbying subsidy. °3 A similar theory could be developed to sup-
port some legislative exemptions for religion.
IV. THE SOLUTIONS OF THE COMMENTATORS: How LITTLE THE
DIFFERENCE?
Perhaps the strength of the argument against the constitu-
tionally compelled exemption is best judged by comparing it with
the proposals of those who are more favorable to the free exercise
claim for exemption. Particularly interesting is that a substantial
wealth and inclination to buy up pieces of the secular economy." Id. See also Texas
Monthly v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (Texas sales tax exemption for religious pub-
lisher violates establishment clause since it does not provide similar benefits to non-religious
publishers); Marshall & Blomgren, supra note 198, at 329-30 (exemptions for religious
institutions, especially from regulations affecting the political process, the media, and other
areas in which dissemination of ideas is important, confer benefits on these religious
institutions).
201. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that section 702 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which exempted religious 'organizations' from a prohibition against
religious discrimination in employment, did not violate the establishment clause).
202. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
203. Id. at 546-51.
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difference in theory has not led to a substantial difference in
result.
To be sure, most commentators, although critical of a mini-
malist free exercise approach, offer no methodology for deciding
free exercise claims.0 4 Some have proposed a unitary inquiry for
free exercise and establishment, but in their efforts to provide a
broad theoretical understanding of the religion clauses, they have
left the issue of free exercise exemptions largely unaddressed.0 5
Professors McConnell, Pepper, and Lupu do provide solutions, but
on close inspection their solutions are not significantly different
from the current jurisprudence or, indeed, from the free exercise
as expression thesis.
Concerned about the threat to religious values posed by gov-
ernmental inquiry into sincerity and definition, Professor McCon-
nell posits that religious exemptions should be recognized in cases
where the government is already reviewing claims on a case-by-
case basis:
When decisions must be made quickly, authoritatively, and
even-handedly by operational personnel, the government may be
entitled to resist interposing requirements of religious accommo-
dation. But when decisions already involve case-by-case, subjec-
tive considerations, there should be little procedural objection to
requiring the government to take religion into account as well. 06
Certainly McConnell's distinction does help explain why reli-
gious claims were upheld in the unemployment compensation
cases20 7 while denied in other cases, such as the military uniform
case of Goldman v. Weinberger.20 8 In the unemployment compen-
sation cases, the state was involved in discretionary decision-mak-
ing, while in cases such as Goldman it was not.
Nonetheless, why is the threat to religious liberty any less
serious when sincerity and definition determinations are made by
an individual accustomed to other types of discretionary decision-
making than it is with persons "who otherwise . . . exercise little
204. For an interesting effort to apply economic analysis to religion clause claims,
see McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1 (1989).
205. See Choper, supra note 94; McCoy & Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249 (1986).
206. See McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 56, at 156.
207. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
208. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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discretion to make ad hoc judgments?"20 9 McConnell argues that
the judgments of the latter would likely be the product of highly
subjective perceptions and therefore insufficiently sensitive to the
needs and practices of unfamiliar religious faiths. The experienced
decision-maker would be in a dissimilar position.210 Yet, it seems
questionable that an unemployment benefits official trained in de-
ciding what constitutes a valid secular reason to be unavailable for
work would be able to evaluate, for either sincerity or religiosity, a
claim such as that advanced by Eddie Thomas, that his religious
conviction forbade him to work in an armaments factory. An un-
employment benefits officer and any official unaccustomed to dis-
cretionary decision-making would probably be equally incompe-
tent to judge either the sincerity or the religiosity of Thomas's
claim.
Professor McConnell does not limit the situations in which
free exercise claims for exemptions should be recognized to cases
involving pre-existing procedural mechanisms for case-by-case de-
terminations. He states that "in some instances the religious claim
for exemption will be so strong that the government may be re-
quired to establish procedures for its protection." '' Nevertheless,
it is clear that the primary mechanism McConnell employs to
avoid the definition/sincerity dilemma prevents significantly ex-
panded notions of free exercise protection. Moreover, even his
modest proposal does not avoid the inquiries acknowledged as
threatening to religious liberty interests.
Professor Pepper, on the other hand, is less deterred by the
threats to religious liberty that the inquiry into sincerity and defi-
nition creates. He argues that, in order for free exercise to be
taken seriously, the sincerity inquiry must also be taken seri-
ously.21 2 There is some question, however, whether Professor Pep-
per's sincerity inquiry is workable. 1 3 Justice Jackson's dissent in
209. McConnell, Neutrality, supra note 56, at 156.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 157.
212. Pepper, supra note 17, at 325-31.
213. Professor Pepper advocates a bifurcated approach. Id. at 327-30. He suggests
that when an exemption might invite fraudulent claims, such as exclusion from taxes, the
recognition of the legitimacy of a claim for exemption should be relatively circumscribed.
Id. at 328. In other cases, the Court should face the sincerity question directly by examin-
ing such factors as past conduct and by seeking the testimony of corroborating witnesses.
Id. Pepper acknowledges the possibility of error in the sincerity inquiry but asserts that
such error is "simply . . .a cost of granting a meaningful constitutional privilege in this
area." Id.
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Ballard, in which he questioned the possibility of making any
judgments about religious sincerity without also making judg-
ments about religious credibility, still rings true. 14 How can one
evaluate the sincerity of a religious claim without evaluating its
believability, and if the inquiry into believability is prohibited by
the religion clauses, how can one question sincerity at all? Even
more important for present purposes, however, is how Professor
Pepper would deal with the definition of religion. His response,
motivated in part by the "secularization of society," is to create a
generalized protection for conscience, including matters of con-
science that are beyond religious derivation.1 5 Professor Pepper,
in short, agrees with the central contention of this Article: that
religious and non-religious rights should be treated equally. He
would simply protect non-religious activities through the free exer-
cise clause. Perhaps the difference between the approach advo-
cated by Professor Pepper and the one advocated here is merely a
matter of semantics.
Professor Ira Lupu has also advanced a theory worth noting
at this point. Lupu's theory primarily addresses the burden in-
quiry in free exercise analysis and not the constitutionally com-
pelled free exercise exemption itself.2"6 However, since his position
implicitly accepts the propriety of the exemption, it sheds light on
some of the relevant issues.
Indeed, Professor Lupu begins with one of the central conten-
tions set forth here: The religiosity and sincerity inquiries required
in free exercise analysis are highly problematic and potentially
threatening to religious values.217 In fact, his proposal of a thresh-
old burden inquiry is primarily designed to minimize the need for
the religiosity and sincerity inquiries.
Specifically, Lupu's proposal is that the inquiry into whether
religious exercise is burdened by government action is best accom-
plished by reference to common law principles rather than to inde-
214. .United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("If we try religious sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the dispute from the
very considerations which in common experience provide its most reliable answer."), rev'd
on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
215. Pepper, supra note 17, at 332.
216. Lupu, Burdens, supra note 43, at 936 (although many aspects of free exercise
have been well canvassed, little has been written about the threshold requirement for all
free exercise claims).
217. Id. at 953-60. Lupu also discusses the centrality inquiry that some courts have
used in free exercise analysis along with religiosity and sincerity. Id. at 958-59.
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pendent religious determination. 18 Courts will be asked to ascer-
tain whether the government action infringes on religious exercise
by examining the infringement according to common law con-
structs. Thus, for Lupu, Lyng2 19 is an example of a case where a
common-law burden might exist because the Indians in that case
had presumably developed a common law analog to an easement
on the government property in question.22 0 As applied, then, the
common law principle becomes "a religion-neutral veil behind
which judges in free exercise cases can assess burdens on religion
from a more objective vantage point than is otherwise
available."22'
Interestingly, Lupu does not seriously dispute that his posi-
tion "may coincide only roughly and fortuitously with our intu-
itions about what kinds of government intrusions upon religion are
most severe or troublesome." '2 Nor does he argue why possibly
fortuitous claims should be entitled to special and even unique ex-
emption. Rather, instead of a claim for favoritism, Lupu's position
is ultimately based on the conclusion, wholly accepted here, that
existing free exercise methodology should be replaced with a more
workable and less manipulable approach.223
V. FAILURE TO TAKE RELIGION SERIOUSLY
At this point, a reader unfamiliar with the literature might be
perplexed: If both sides of the free exercise debate agree 1) that
the breadth of religious activity currently protected outside the
free exercise clause is extensive, 2) that there are problems in ei-
ther allowing or disallowing the free exercise, constitutionally
compelled claims for exemption, and 3) that the results that would
be achieved under the competing proposals are not dramatically
different, then what is all the fuss about? Why is the debate over
free exercise rights so strident?
The answer appears to be that the disagreement is not with
218. Id. at 966-77.
219. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
220. Lupu, Burdens, supra note 43, at 973-76. Lupu also argues that Sherbert,
Thomas, and Hobble meet his common-law test because they are an infringement on the
modern day property concept of "entitlement." Id. at 977-82. In contrast, government poli-
cies which create only "psychic pressure on a religious minority to conform to or to believe
in general community norms" would not meet a common law burden inquiry. Id. at 964.
221. Id. at 971.
222. Id. at 970.
223. Id. at 972.
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the free exercise clause at all, nor is it with the constitutionally
compelled exemption. Rather, the basic dispute concerns the man-
ner in which existing constitutional law treats religious claims.
Critics contend that the current jurisprudence and the approach
advocated here are, in essence, antagonistic to religion.224 If the
results in the cases have been criticized as not taking free exercise
seriously, then the jurisprudence as a whole has been accused of
not taking religion seriously. Purportedly it has failed to incorpo-
rate a religious, as opposed to a secular, understanding of religion
into its methodology.
There are three manifestations of this criticism. One is that
contemporary constitutional theory rejects religion because it sees
religion as irrational.225 A second is that it rejects religion because
constitutional theory is individual-rights oriented, while religion is
communal.2 ' A third is that constitutional theory has failed to
accept religion on the latter's own terms because constitutional
theory is based upon notions of freedom of choice, while religion is
based upon notions of absolutism and obligations to a transcen-
dent authority, notions which deny the right to choose any com-
peting value systems.227
There is anger in these criticisms. By treating religion as sim-
ply one form of belief, by failing to take religion on its own non-
rational terms, liberal constitutional theory, according to the crit-
ics, has held religion in contempt. Professor Carter states this at-
tack most strongly in connection with his claim that liberal consti-
tutional theory rejects religion as irrational:
It is [the] intuition - the understanding that religion and
reason exist in tension with one another - which bottoms the
liberal discomfort from public religious argument. In the end we
224. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
225. Carter, supra note 8, at 985-92 (arguments are addressed to what author terms
contemporary liberalism's treatment of religion); see also Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note
162, at 1604-05 (under objective legal analysis, religion appears irrational).
226. See, e.g., Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at 729-38 (recognizing the difficulty
of fitting religion into constitutional law categories and suggesting that the existing confu-
sion might be alleviated by interpreting the religion clauses under a unifying doctrinal or
theoretical approach).
227. See Ingber, supra note 10, at 283 ("Constitutionalism . . . stresses the sanctity
of individual choice, freedom and dignity . . . . [R]eligion itself often is [inconsistent with
this individualistic orientation]."); Sandel, supra note 10, at 610 ("Madison and Jefferson
understood religious liberty as the right to exercise religious duties according to the dictates
of conscience, not the right to choose religious beliefs. In fact, their argument for religious
liberty relies heavily on the assumption that beliefs are not a matter of choice.").
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come back to the beginning; those who believe that God can
heal disease are dangerous primitives. They are primitive be-
cause they do not celebrate reason as the path to the knowledge
to the world. They are dangerous because if they do not cele-
brate reason, they may not be amenable to reason, and anyone
not amenable to reason is a threat to liberal society. 28
Unfortunately, some needless objection to religion has been set
forth in the religion clause jurisprudence. The suggestion in some
establishment clause cases22  and some commentary2 30 that reli-
gion must stay out of politics and public life seems inappropriate,
if not impossible.3 1 Similarly, the underlying premise in the paro-
chial-aid cases, that teachers in religious schools are incapable of
teaching secular subjects without inculcating religious values, is
particularly unfair.2 32 Nevertheless, it is a mistake to ascribe a
restrictive view of the legitimacy of the free exercise exemption to
hostility towards religion.
First, the argument that constitutional theory rejects religion
because of the latter's supposed irrationality is simply a red her-
ring. A great deal of irrational activity has been protected under
the constitution, including that so-called model of rationality, the
speech clause. Paul Cohen's statement on the back of his jacket,
for example, was not a form of logical discourse.233 The protecting
of intimate association under the due process clause is also a trib-
228. Carter, supra note 8, at 992.
229. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971) ("Ordinarily politi-
cal debate and division, however vigorous even partisan, are normal and healthy manifesta-
tions of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to pro-
tect."). For a critical account of the establishment clause cases see Gaffney, supra note
162, at 225 (The idea that religion and politics cannot be combined is "bad law, bad polit-
ics, and bad theology").
230. Cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) ("Justice and a just society are
not dependent on each other because there "is no place for the question whether . . . men's
perception of the religious practices of others might not be so upsetting that liberty of
conscience should not be allowed.").
231. See, e.g., A.J. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 348-49 (1985)
("[R]epublican government depends for its health on values that over the not-so-long run
must come from religion.").
232. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 502 (1985) (assuming that teachers employed
by the state to teach in a religious school might inculcate religious doctrine, although the
record established that there had not been such an incident in the nineteen years the aid
program had been in effect); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) ("A Pennsylvania
statute that authorized state funding for teachers of private-school students created "the
danger that religious doctrine [would] become intertwined with secular instruction").
233. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (The jacket bore the message "Fuck
The Draft").
406 [Vol. 40:357
CASE AGAINST FREE EXERCISE EXEMPTION
ute to the constitutional acknowledgment of the value of the non-
rational aspects of human life.234
More importantly, constitutional theory does not blindly ac-
cept secular positions as based on reason, nor does it blindly reject
religion as based on non-rationality. The two spheres are not mu-
tually exclusive.2 35 Rationality does not end where religion begins,
nor does rationality begin where religion ends. Indeed, as noted
above, first principles, including the notion that reason can be
used to solve human problems, are based on their own non-ra-
tional beliefs and a priori assumptions.23 6 I personally find the as-
sumption that currently underlies the economic analysis of law,
that "man is a rational maximizer of his self-interest, ' '237 to be
one of the great irrational leaps of faith of the twentieth century.
What is true, as Professors Gedicks and Hendrix claim, is
that the languages of law and religion are incongruent. Law's lan-
guage of "objectivity, rationality, and empiricism" is not compati-
ble with religion's language of "faith, belief, and divine judg-
ment."' 238 However, the inability to capture the essence of religion
in a logical medium is not hostility to religion; rather, it is the
inevitable result of placing any non-rational belief system, reli-
gious or secular, into a rational process.2 39
The contention that free exercise jurisprudence demonstrates
the inability of constitutional law to come to grips with non-indi-
vidualistic values is perhaps partially correct, but, in any event,
essentially misses the point. Constitutional theory has had diffi-
culty providing a framework within which communal rights can
be protected. 240 However, free exercise is not the only area in
which this has occurred and, indeed, it is not accurate to place
free exercise rights solely in the communal-rights camp. Religious
exercise is often individualistic, 241 and non-religious value systems
234. See generally Karst, supra note 126 (discusses the value of intimate association
and the scope of the constitutional doctrines utilized as the underpinnings of this freedom).
235. See Greenawalt, Rationality, supra note 162, at 1062 ("[R]eligious convictions
are part of the groundwork against which rational arguments are set.").
236. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
237. R. POSNERt, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (1986).
238. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 162, at 1604-05.
239. Id. Gedicks and Hendrix would argue, however, that law's language should
more actively attempt to accommodate non-rational belief systems. Id. at 1603-10.
240. Garet, supra note 114, at 1003-04, 1029-36; Tushnet, Religion, supra note 9, at
702.
241. For example, Eddie Thomas's objection to working in an armaments factory
was apparently idiosyncratic. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
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and beliefs are often communal.24 More importantly, the non-in-
dividualist criticism strays far from the attack on the rejection of
the free exercise exemption. Even if the jurisprudence unduly min-
imizes communal rights, the question remains why religious, and
only religious, groups or individuals should be entitled to
exemption.
The critics are correct, however, when they contend that con-
stitutional law does not recognize religious claims, or at least the
claims of some religions, 43 to transcendent authority. Constitu-
tional law does not recognize that to some religious adherents, re-
ligious beliefs are not products of individual choice, but are abso-
lute truths imposed by an external authority. Liberal
constitutional theory, in short, treats religion as simply another
belief system. As Professor Michael Smith writes, "[t]he very pro-
pensity to identify freedom of religion with freedom of speech im-
plies that religion is primarily a secular activity. It assumes that
thought and expression, whether in the realm of politics, science
or religion, are basically alike."244
The mistake, however, is to view this treatment as pejorative.
Constitutional theory protects freedom of choice by assuming that
there are a number of belief systems that an individual may adopt
and that the individual is free to choose among the competing sys-
tems. Liberal constitutional theory recognizes the possibility that
any one of the belief systems may be true, but because its under-
lying theory is based on possibility rather than authority, it cannot
treat any particular system as the Truth.245 Thus, liberal theory
reacts to the belief of the religious adherent as if that individual
chose her particular belief system rather than having had the
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (refusal of Jehovah's Witness to work on military-related project
based on personal interpretation of scripture rather than specific Jehovah's Witnesses
doctrine).
242. Garet, supra note 114, at 1008-09 ("[A]ssembly, religion, equality [all] have
groupness at their core.").
243. Ingber, supra note 10, at 283-86 (distinguishing between "group ideology,"
which he argues ought to be subordinated to the Constitutional ideology, and religion,
which is based on "duties or obligations that precede those made by human beings" and
ought therefore not be subordinated to a constitutional ideology).
244. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT. REv.
83 at 116; see also Carter, supra note 8, at 978 (arguing that the liberal constitutional
jurisprudence threatens to turn religious belief into "a kind of hobby"); Pepper, supra note
17, at 307 ("From a modern constitutional perspective, religion is more likely to be per-
ceived as akin to race: of no intrinsic importance, but subject historically to abuse and
persecution and therefore 'inherently suspect' as a basis for government classification.").
245. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 14-15.
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truths and obligations of that belief system imposed upon her by
transcendent authority.
This approach necessarily creates a tension between liberal
constitutional theory and religion (or at least some religion). Lib-
eral constitutional theory treats religious belief as a function of
individual choice, while some religion treats religious beliefs as
"externally imposed upon the faithful." '246 That liberal constitu-
tional theory resolves this tension in favor of itself, by assuming
that an individual's beliefs are the product of choice and not of
externally imposed authority, is not indicative of hostility. An ap-
proach which treats religious beliefs as equal to non-religious be-
liefs cannot be characterized as hostile to religion; there is no an-
tagonism in equal treatment.
Moreover, the hostility argument loses its force because it
cannot seriously be contended that either the Court's current ap-
proach or a speech methodology is non-protective of religious val-
ues.241 7 The constitutional standard applied in speech cases is, after
all, the Court's most stringent.2 48 The reluctance to inquire into
sincerity and religiosity is also based on concerns protective of re-
ligious values.249
Additionally, although reliance on assumptions of individual
choice may at some level conflict with absolutist understandings,
one should not forget that principles of individual choice and reli-
gion are not always antithetical. Indeed, as Professor Giannella
has argued, the protection of rights of choice benefits religion:
The growth and advancement of a religious sect must come from
the voluntary support of its membership. Religious voluntarism
thus conforms to that abiding part of the American credo which
assumes that both religion and society will be strengthened if
spiritual and ideological claims seek recognition on the basis of
their intrinsic merit. . . the free competition of faiths and ideas
is expected to guarantee their excellence and vitality to the ben-
efit of the entire society. 50
246. Ingber, supra note 10, at 282.
247. Giannella, supra note 133, at 517.
248. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 135-51 & 206-23 and accompanying text.
250. Giannella, supra note 133, at 517 (citations omitted); see also Gedicks, supra
note 110, at 161 ("The importance of religious groups to individual and social life, which
gives the groups their strong claim to constitutional protection, is interwined with the as-
sumption that the creation or maintenance of an individual's membership in such groups is
voluntary.").
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It may be, however, that the reason liberal constitutional the-
ory rejects absolutism in favor of its own methodology is more
fundamental. Religious issues must be decided according to the
methodology of constitutional theory because, after all, it is the
constitutional issues involving religion that are being decided.
Logically, for a constitutional theory based on freedom of choice
to advance absolutism would be to deny itself. All liberal theory
can do is recognize the varieties of beliefs and protect the rights of
anyone who chooses to pursue a particular mode of belief, includ-
ing an absolutist one.
The foregoing, of course, is no surprise to the critics. Indeed,
it is their central contention. They would argue, however, that if
liberal constitutional theory subordinates a religious understand-
ing to, or exorcises it from, its treatment of religious cases, the
methodology must be abandoned in favor of one more sympathetic
to religious values.
The easy answer to this criticism is that liberal constitutional
theory may have its deficiencies, but at least it provides a mecha-
nism for deciding cases. Opposing methodologies have yet to offer
solutions for deciding particular disputes.
The second response is a repetition of what has already been
stated in this section: A methodology based upon the assumption
that individual-choice theory is highly protective of religious activ-
ity and voluntarism itself may be beneficial to the development of
religion. Religion may be critical of liberal constitutional theory's
methodology, but it cannot be overly antagonistic to its results.
Indeed, as to this latter point, it might be noted that, although the
pressures of so-called secularism have increased in this century,
participation in religion remains particularly robust.25'
Finally, the claims of hostility to religion miss the mark be-
cause they ignore the fact that the rejection of the absolutist un-
derstanding of religion in favor of individual choice is itself deeply
rooted in religious principle. Critics of the constitutional method-
ology have argued that the liberal state should defer to religion
because religion seeks a Truth that is transcendant and because
the possibility exists that a religious belief system reflects a tran-
251. See M. MARTY, supra note 113, at 11-14 (discussing the revival of religion in
American life); A.J. REICHLEY, supra note 231, at 2 ("By most measurable indices the
United States is a more religious country than any European nation except Ireland and
Poland.").
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scendent truth.252 This position suggests that it would be consis-
tent with the liberal understanding to grant deference to belief
systems that are possibly True. Yet, if there is true knowledge,
there must also be false knowledge, and if the state should defer
to the possibility of higher Truth, this goal may best be served by
supporting notions of individual freedom rather than claims of ex-
ternally imposed duties. Even though it is theologically controver-
sial, one must not dismiss the argument that even if it does not
reflect the religious absolutist's understanding of religion, liberal
constitutional theory reflects a profoundly religious understanding
of the search for Truth; specifically that the search must be a
product of man's freedom rather than of his obligation.253 There-
fore, it is not anti-religious secularism to contend that the Consti-
tution protects only freedom of religion and that the protection of
religion itself, like the protection of any belief system, religious or
secular, true or false, is only derivative.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's efforts to construct a free exercise anal-
ysis which allows for the creation of constitutionally compelled
free exercise exemptions have been unsuccessful. The cases have
been inconsistent, the results troubling, and the methodology
confused.
The difficulties within the free exercise jurisprudence, how-
ever, are not only methodological. The maintenance of the free
exercise exemption does not intelligibly, or even stringently, pro-
tect religious values and religious liberties. Indeed, by requiring
investigation into definitions of religion and sincerity of religious
claims, the exemption is counterproductive to religious values.
Most importantly, however, the constitutionally compelled
free exercise exemption sets forth a false dichotomy between secu-
lar and religious belief systems and ignores the similarity of their
functions and effects in the political and social environment. By
preferring religious belief systems over all others, including philo-
sophical, moral, and political belief systems, this exemption of-
fends the equality-of-ideas notion that is at the core of constitu-
252. E.g., McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 9, at 14-15.
253. Indeed, some would suggest that it is the absolutist position that demeans reli-
gion. See generally F. DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, "THE GRAND INQUISI-
TOR" 264-70 (C. Garnett trans. Modern Library ed. 1950) (God offers man freedom, reli-
gion offers miracle, mystery, and authority).
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tional law. For this reason alone, the argument for constitutionally
compelled free exercise exemptions should be rejected. Rejecting
constitutionally favored treatment for religion will assure that one
type of belief system is not artificially and unalterably fortified to
the detriment of another.
